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Introduction
On December 18, 2009, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 2012
the International Year of Cooperatives. The UN Resolution recognized “that
cooperatives, in their various forms, promote the fullest possible participation in the
economic and social development of all people…are becoming a major factor of
economic and social development and contribute to the eradication of poverty.” 1 Around
the world, more than 1 billion people are members of cooperatives. They provide about
100 million jobs worldwide, 20 percent more than multinational enterprises. 2 From
Kenya, India, and Vietnam to France, Germany, Canada, and the United States—and
most places betwixt and between—consumer, producer, purchasing, and worker
cooperatives—as well as some hybrids—exist to meet the needs of people. Some
countries witness profound cooperative density while others experience cooperatives as a
scarce organizational model. And, in different countries, different cooperative varieties
experience differing degrees of popularity and prevalence.
In the United States, about 30,000 cooperative enterprises boast more than
100,000 million members. 3 Over 3,000 farmer-owned producer cooperatives market
roughly 30 percent of all farm products in the country today. Close to 6,500 housing
consumer cooperatives house more than 1 million households. 270 telephone consumer
cooperatives service 2 million homes. Almost 1,000 rural electric consumer cooperatives
provide power for 36 million people. 250 purchasing cooperatives serve over 50,000
independent small businesses for the purpose of group buying and shared services. Over

1

A/RES/64/136
"Cooperatives Around the World." Home. Accessed January 25, 2014. http://usa2012.coop/about-coops/cooperatives-around-world.
3
Ibid.
2
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80 million Americans are members of credit unions—a form of consumer cooperatives.
And, about 300 worker cooperative businesses operate in the United States. 4
While, by and large, these figures appear rather impressive, the overall share of
the market commanded by cooperatives is rather small and the extreme scarcity of
worker cooperatives in particular is striking. In some instances, cooperatives serve as a
niche response to market shortcoming, and therefore should be expected to be a small
portion of the market; for instance farmer-owned producer cooperatives, telephone and
electric consumer cooperatives, and purchasing cooperatives generally perform this
function. However, in other instances the scarcity of the cooperative form is more
mysterious. The scarcity of credit unions, relative to for-profit commercial banks, and the
pronounced scarcity of worker cooperatives generally are particularly interesting.
The UN proclamation touts the benefits of the cooperative form, based on
principles of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, and member-equity, for not only
the economy but also for workers. While big, and small, hierarchically structured,
investor-owned, for-profit firms dominate the American economy, they may not all be
working for the economy and American workers as well as some democratically
structured, cooperative firms would. Industrial organization literature seeks to explain
why firms organize the way they do. The vast majority of such literature finds that firms
organize as hierarchical and investor-owned for purposes of productivity and efficiency
(which translate into profit). Other research, however, suggests that institutions do not
need to organize hierarchically and be investor-owned to be productive and efficient,
even as they grow to be quite large. Research on cooperative ownership reveals that, in
4

John Curl. For All the People: Uncovering the Hidden History of Cooperation, Cooperative Movements,
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terms of productivity, survivability, and longevity, cooperative firms can perform as well
as or better than their more conventional counterparts while improving patron or worker
welfare and building stronger communities. Somewhere in the contradiction between the
UN proclamation and US reality, and the broad, contentious literature regarding
cooperatives, I stumbled upon my interest in pursuing the questions of why financial
consumer cooperatives (credit unions) and worker cooperatives are so scarce in US and
what opportunities exist for cooperatives to scale up in both size and scope. It is my hope
that this thesis contributes to creating a more thorough understanding of these questions.
Defining Cooperatives
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) defines cooperatives as “businesses
owned and run by and for their members. Whether the members are the customers,
employees or residents they have an equal say in what the business does and a share in
the profits.” 5 This broad definition of cooperatives is usefully supplemented by 7
fundamental principles which act as guidelines for putting the cooperative values of selfhelp, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity into practice. These 7
principles are: voluntary and open membership, democratic member control, member
economic participation, autonomy and independence, education, training and
information, cooperation among cooperatives, and concern for community. 6 Within these
cooperative principles and values, a number of different specific forms occur. Different
iterations of producer, consumer, worker, and purchasing operate under these values and
principles throughout the world. As this paper focuses narrowly on credit unions and

5

"What's a Co-op?" ICA: International Co-operative Alliance. Accessed February 21, 2014.
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worker cooperatives, I will provide a somewhat more specific explanation of each,
although variation exists within each category.
Credit unions, as a form of cooperative, necessarily conform to the above values
and principles. In particular, as a form of mutual financial intermediary, credit unions
maintain key features of one-man/one-vote, residual claimants (owners) both supply and
use funds, and dividends are distributed to both savers and borrowers. 7 Importantly,
because the owners are also the consumers, cooperative banks return their profits to their
owner-customers in the form of preferable rates on loaning and saving instruments before
distributing any remaining dividends.
Worker cooperatives generally conform to the overarching cooperative definition,
but are unique in some ways. Although a hard and strict universal definition of a worker
cooperative does not exist—indeed, cooperative ‘hybrids’ have emerged recently, further
complicating matters 8—several defining characteristics are identifiable. The United
States Federation of Worker Cooperatives asserts two central characteristics of
cooperatives: 1) “Worker members invest in and own the business together, and it
distributes surplus to them” and 2) “decision-making is democratic, adhering to the
general principle of one member-one vote.” 9 Additionally, dividends are distributed on
the basis of worker contribution in the form of time commitment rather than financial
contribution.

7

Carlos Cuevas and Klaus Fischer Cuevas. Cooperative Financial Institutions: Issues in Governance,
Regulation, and Supervision. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006.
8
See Fabio Chaddad. "Advancing The Theory Of The Cooperative Organization: The Cooperative As A True
Hybrid." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 83, no. 4 (2012)
9
"What Is a Worker Cooperative?" US Federation of Worker Cooperatives. Accessed November 7, 2013.
http://www.usworker.coop/about/what-is-a-worker-coop.
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Literature Review
My literature review will proceed in two parts. As I will be narrowly discussing
credit unions and worker cooperatives in the body of my thesis, I will first review
literature surrounding financial consumer cooperatives and then review literature
surrounding worker cooperatives.
Credit Unions
Credit Unions developed in their earliest iterations as the Schulze-Delitzsch and
Raiffeisen credit societies in mid-19th century Germany. These antecedents to modern
credit unions were developed in response to perceived failures in formal financial
institutions. Credit cooperatives could operate where banks could not due to “a detailed
knowledge of local economic conditions which allowed these credit cooperatives to more
efficiently screen potential members, and thus more easily and quickly identify borrower
who might default,” which allowed the cooperatives to dispense of high-cost practices
and pass along these saving to members. 10 Importantly, the earliest credit unions were
built on cooperative principles coming out of Great Britain, with the experiments of
Robert Owen at New Lanark and the Rochdale Pioneers, that highlighted the
abovementioned values rather than profit-maximization, which is crucial for
understanding credit union theory to this day.
Neoclassical theories of the firm are not entirely useful for understanding the
economic behavior of any cooperative firm, including credit unions, because such theory
assumes that firms seeks to profit maximize. Credit unions, like all cooperative firms, do
not primarily seek to profit maximize and thus do not fit this model. As a consequence,
10

Donal Mckillop , and John O.s. Wilson. "Credit Unions: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview." Financial
Markets, Institutions & Instruments 20, no. 3 (2011). Pg. 6
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there is a divide in theoretical literature regarding credit unions. More neoclassical
approaches to understanding the firm often predict instability and failure for credit
unions, but more flexible approaches to modeling firm behavior have generated credit
union predictions that are decidedly more optimistic. 11
Credit union theory steeped in neoclassical assumptions tends to view credit
unions as potential sources of weakness in financial systems. Goodhart (2004) suggests
that “the presence of any non-profit maximizing baking entities may make financial
systems more fragile.” 12 Hesse and Cihak (2007) reflect that “if a cooperative bank’s
pursuit of objectives other than profit maximization results in very low profitability, its
balance sheet risks grow faster than its capital, leading to deteriorating solvency.” 13 And,
they further suggest that if cooperative banks “accept lower profitability as the price to
pay for delivering financial services as below-market prices to retail clients, they may
pull down the profitability of the banking system, with negative repercussions for other
banks’ soundness.” 14
Because credit unions do not fit the model of a profit maximizing firm, a number
of authors have offered alternative modeling systems for credit unions to demonstrate
how they accomplish stability without a primary goal of profit maximization firm. 15
Unlike the above assumptions, these theories argue that, despite not being profit driven,
11

It is worth note that the literature on cooperative banking is generally rather scarce itself. Heiko Hesse
and Martin Cihak (2007) “Cooperative Banks and Financial Stability” IMF Working Paper, Monetary and
Capital Markets Department note that “only about 0.1 percent of all banking-related entries in EconLit, a
major database of economic research, relates to cooperative banking.”
12
Hesse and Cihak (2007) pg. 5, referencing Goodhart (2004)
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
See Smith, P.F. (1971). Financial Intermediation, in Economics of Financial Institutions
and Markets, Homewood, IL: Irwin Publishing; Taylor, R.A. (1971a). The credit union as a cooperative
institution, Review of Social Economy, 29: 206-17; and Davis, K. (1994). Prudential regulation and
Australian credit unions, Australian Journal of Management, 19: 31-46.
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credit unions still take profit into account in order to negotiate best serving member
savers and borrowers. Importantly, Worthington (2004) notes that credit unions in more
deregulated markets (such as the US) must contend with competition and balance the
fulfillment of ideological imperatives against survival, necessarily encouraging credit
unions to achieve financial stability even if they do not profit maximize. 16 Furthermore,
rather than viewing low credit union rates as a source of instability, some consider it an
important mechanism for disciplining consumer credit rates offered by banks. 17
Empirical evidence from credit unions around the world suggests that neoclassical
concerns that credit unions will be inefficient as a result of their non-profit-maximizing
priorities are for naught. Studies of the returns to scale credit unions experience
overwhelmingly demonstrate finding of increasing returns. In the US, at least 6 studies
find evidence of increasing returns to scale. 18 Esho (2000) finds increasing returns to
scale in Australia. 19 In Canada, two studies from the 1980s find slight increasing returns
to scale for credit unions. 20 And, other studies find corroborating increasing returns to
scale in both the UK and New Zealand. 21 Not only do these findings of increasing returns
to scale indicate that credit unions are operating efficiently, they suggest that credit
unions might be well served in sizing up.

16

Worthington, Andrew C. "Determinants of Merger and Acquisition Activity in Australian Cooperative
Deposit-taking Institutions." Journal of Business Research 57, no. 1 (2004): 47-57
17
SeeTokle, R. and Tokle, J. 2000. “The influence of credit union and savings and loan competition on
bank deposit rates in Idaho and Montana”, Review of Industrial Organization, 17: 427-39. and Feinberg,
R.M. 2001. “The competitive role of credit unions in small local financial services markets,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 83: 560-63.
18
McKillop and Wilson (2011), referencing Croteau (1956), Dran (1971), Taylor (1977), Wolken and
Navratil (1980), Fry et al. (1982), and Kohers and Mullis (1988)
19
Ibid, citing Esho (2000)
20
Ibid, citing Murray and White (1983) and Kim (1986)
21
Ibid, citing McKillop et al. (1995) and Sibbald and McAlevey (2003)

the Global Crisis. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Capital and the Debt Trap: Learning from Cooperatives in
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In addition to demonstrating efficiency, credit unions have recently shown their
relative resiliency as compared to commercial banks, suggesting that concerns about
credit unions being a source of fragility in the financial sector are misplaced. While some
researchers suggest that cooperative banks may have greater difficulty adjusting to
adverse circumstances and changing risks, others posit that credit unions, by their very
nature, engage with less risk and are therefore more stable. Both Hansmann (1996) and
Chaddad and Cook (2004) find that credit unions in the US tend to adopt less risky
strategies than demutualized ones. 22 The importance of this less risky strategy of
cooperative banks was illustrated in the recent financial crisis. Bajo and Roelants (2011)
illustrate that in both the US and in EU countries, credit unions were more resilient
during the financial crisis and have outperformed commercial banks since; fewer credit
unions failed than other financial enterprises, credit unions have maintained higher
solvency ratios, and have maintained lending rates higher than other financial
enterprises. 23 Credit unions thus demonstrate both efficiency and stability while offering
members better rates on saving and borrowing devices.
There is surprisingly little discussion of credit union scarcity relative to
commercial banks in the US. But, foremost among explanations offered for credit union
scarcity that do not assert inefficiency focus on the relative inconvenience of using credit
unions and explain their size and scope in terms of demand for credit unions. Essentially
the argument asserts that credit unions generally offer fewer financial products and

22

Henry Hansmann. The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1996.; Fabio R. Chaddad, and Michael L. Cook, 2004, “The Economics of Organization Structure
Changes: A US Perspective on Demutualization,” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 75, No.
4, pp. 575–94.
23
Claudia B.,
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operate on a much smaller scale than commercial banks which creates barriers to
attracting a broader customer base. Some argue that credit unions operate in this fashion
in order to achieve credit union goals. But, research demonstrating that credit unions in
the US achieve increasing returns to scale suggests that credit unions would seek to grow
to maximize member benefits. In line with this view, I argue that credit unions are subject
to unique regulatory burdens that limit their size and scope, ultimately leading to them
being comparatively less convenient than commercial banks. Effectively, there are both
supply and demand side reasons for the scarcity as a result of government policy; public
policy coercively limits the ability of credit unions to supply banking services, which in
turn decreases demand for credit unions.
Worker Cooperatives
Worker cooperatives, like credit unions, find their history rooted in the ideas of
Robert Owen and the Rochdale pioneers. These ideas emerged in response humanitarian
concern for the poor working conditions created by the Industrial Revolution and sought
to create a viable alternative. The viability of those ideas, as they relate to worker
cooperative in particular have been greatly contended over. A review of the literature
surrounding employee ownership 24 provides insight into various explanations for the
scarcity of worker cooperatives and the support for such explanations. Firm performance
measured by productivity, longevity, and survivability are often at the center of worker
cooperative theory, which speculates about the impacts of employee ownership on a firm.
Early theoretical work suggests that employee ownership creates inefficiency by creating

24

Note that employee ownership research includes non-cooperative style ownership. A large amount of
evidence is gleaned from ownership in the form of Employee Stock Ownership Plans that, at times, greatly
resemble worker cooperatives in structure. Because of cooperative scarcity, it is useful to include such
research.
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a free-rider, or 1/n, problem where employee-owners shirk because the fruits of their
labor are broadly distributed. 25 Another source of concern with employee-ownership is
the presumed inefficiency of costly collective decision making. 26 Additionally, early
theory regarding employee ownership contends that employee-owners are likely to be
extremely risk-averse, because they have all of their eggs in one basket. 27
Proponents of employee ownership, meanwhile, theorize that such schemes will
do precisely the opposite; they suggest that employee ownership increases efficiency.
Proponents assert that employee ownership solves the principal-agent problem 28 by
aligning the interests of employees with those of the firm (either partially, through some
stock ownership, or more thoroughly, as with cooperatives) and thus incentivizes
employees to work harder voluntarily. 29 They argue that the free-rider problem is
mitigated by peer monitoring and pressure not to shirk. 30 Additionally, proponents claim
that the coincidence of interests created by employee ownership eases collective
decision-making costs because conflicts between management and employees are less
likely. 31 Critically, some research suggests that a combination of both financial interest
and decision-making authority is necessary to capture the benefits of employee

25

See Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”
The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795
26
Hansmann (1996)
27
Ibid.
28
The principal-agent problem concerns the difficulty in motivating employees (agents) to act in the best
interest of their employers (principals) when the two parties have divergent interests. For instance, a
simple hourly wage may not induce peak performance from an employee because they do not gain from
inputting increased effort that improves their productivity.
29
Margaret Blair., D. Kruse, and J. Blasi. “Employee Ownership: An Unstable Form or a Stabilizing
Force?” In The New Relationship: Human Capital in the American Corporation, ed. M.Blair and T. Kochan,
241-298. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute 2000.
30
Ibid.
31
Rhokeun Park, Douglas Kruse, and James Sesil, “DOES EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP ENHANCE FIRM
SURVIVAL?,” Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory & Labor-Managed Firms 8 (July 6, 2004)
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ownership, making worker cooperatives a strong option due to their inherent pairing of
ownership with workplace democracy. 32
In large part, empirical research supports the arguments made by proponents of
employee ownership. By giving employees a financial stake in the company they work
for through profit sharing, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), or directly as in
worker cooperatives, firms generally improve performance relative to similar firms
without employee ownership. 33 Studies assessing the impact of employee ownership in
the form of ESOPs tend to demonstrate neutral or positive relationships between
employee ownership and firm performance, but fail to establish significance individually.
Despite lacking individual significance, Kruse and Blasi (1995), performing a metaanalysis of ESOP studies found a significant positive overall relationship and determined
that firm productivity improves an average of 4.4% in the year an ESOP is adopted. 34
This relationship lends support to the theoretical finding that employee ownership can
incentivize employees to work harder. But, the variability of effects among ESOPs may
reflect the impact of differing levels of ownership and the presence of employee
involvement in decision making relative to financial stake. 35 There is some conflicting
evidence about whether, in the presence of an ESOP, employee participation in decisionmaking yields positive or negative productivity effects, but the former generally appears
to be true.

32

Avner Ben-Ner, and Derek C. Jones. "Employee Participation, Ownership, and Productivity: A
Theoretical Framework." Industrial Relations 34, no. 4 (1995)
33
Georgeanne M. Artz, and Younjun Kim. Business Ownership by Workers: Are Worker Cooperatives a
Viable Option? Working paper no. 11020. Iowa State University, 2011.
34
Douglas L. Kruse. and Blasi, J. R.. Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes, and Firm
Performance. NBER Working Paper w5277, U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research 1995.
35
Artz and Kim (2011)
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Empirical evidence on worker cooperatives specifically tends to find positive
productivity impacts as well. Craig et al. (1995) demonstrated that worker cooperatives in
the US plywood industry are between 6 and 14 percent more efficient than their more
traditional counterparts with regard to output, holding inputs constant. 36 Bartlett et al.
(1992) found higher value-added per worker, indicating higher productivity, among
cooperative workers in a comparison of Italian worker cooperatives in light
manufacturing with similar similarly sized private firms in the same sector and region. 37
Perhaps something unique about cooperative structure better incentivizes worker
productivity; it may be the level of employee investment, the level of employee
involvement in decision-making, or the relationship between these two factors.
In addition to productivity, rates of firm survival and longevity are studied as a
means for assessing the performance and efficiency of employee-owned firms.
Theoretical work cautions that employee-owned firms will be shorter lived than more
conventional firms. Vanek (1970) argues that worker cooperatives are often likely to fail
as a result of their reliance on internal investment, which is likely insufficient because of
members’ incentive to keep a greater portion of profits than they ought, rather than
reinvesting. 38 Ben-Ner (1995), meanwhile, applies ‘degeneration theory’ and asserts that
cooperatives are likely to degenerate into more traditional firms over time as nonmembers replaced members. Others claim that cooperatives will degenerate into investor-

36

Artz and Kim (2011)
Ibid.
38
Jaroslav Vanek. The General Theory of Labor-managed Market Economies. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1970.
37
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owned firms over time as they grow and become successful because worker-members can
sell their shares at a high price. 39
Empirical support for these theories of cooperative behavior is limited; indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that cooperative survival and longevity exceeds that of
comparable conventional firms. Robinson and Zhang (2005), analyzing firm survival for
a set of UK public companies between 1988 and 2001, found that “companies with
employee ownership stakes of 5% or more were only 76% as likely to disappear (merge,
be acquired, or fail) compared with all public companies…For 100% employee-owned
firms, the relative rate of failure falls to 33.5%.” 40 They found that employee ownership
protects investments in firm-specific knowledge and skills for both the firm and the
employees. In a study of the viability of employee-owned firms in France, Estrin and
Jones (1992) showed that 30% of worker cooperatives across a variety of industries had
existed for over 30 years in 1979. Not only did they demonstrate little evidence of
degeneration, they also found that the cooperatives were as productive, profitable, and
capital-intensive as other firms. 41 Park, Kruse, and Sesil (2004) suggest that employeeowned firms may be more long-lived than other firms because of “functional flexibility in
which employees have a broad range of skill, input into decision-making, and a greater
willingness to make adjustments during economic difficulties.” 42 The survival rate and
longevity of cooperatives suggests that they can act as an important stabilizing force
during times of economic recession or downturn. Employee-owned, and more
specifically, cooperative, firm structure, then, contrary to early theory on the matter, has
39

Artz and Kim (2011)
Ibid pg. 19
41
Saul Estrin, and Derek Jones. “The Viability of Employee-Owned Firms: Evidence from France.”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45(2):323-338 (1992).
42
Park, Kruse, and Sesil (2004) pg. 29
40
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empirically demonstrated to be efficient in terms of productivity, survivability, and
longevity performance.
Additionally, it appears that economic measures of efficiency can indeed be
compatible with worker welfare. Evidence demonstrates that employee ownership
produces better pay, job security, and job satisfaction than other firms do. Blasi, Conte,
and Kruse (1996) “found that US public companies with broad-based employee
ownership plans [at least 5 percent of stock] had 8 percent higher average compensation
levels than other comparable public companies, and compensation increased with the
percentage of stock held by employees.” 43 And, case evidence for worker cooperatives
often report higher compensation as compared with non-cooperative firms in the same
industry. Hochner et al. (1988) reveal a grocery cooperative in Philadelphia that
“maintained higher levels of full-time jobs at higher wages than competitors without
decreasing profits. 44 At a worker-owned grocery in the San Francisco Bay Meyer (2006)
showed that average compensation for employees was 40% greater than that of unionized
grocery workers in California. 45
Along with better compensation, evidence demonstrates that worker cooperatives
provide greater job security than other firms. Employee-owner participation in decisionmaking results in a greater tendency among cooperatives to adjust wages rather than cut
jobs when the firm is stressed. Craig and Pencavel (1993) show that, between 1968 and
1986, plywood cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest were more likely to adjust wage

43

Douglas Kruse, Richard B. Freeman, and Joseph R. Blasi. Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee
Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2010 pg. 260
44
Artz and Kim (2011) pg. 20
45
Ibid.
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levels than employment levels compared with other types of mills. 46 Generally,
cooperatives are more inclined to adjust wages rather than employment; in times of
increased output, cooperatives have demonstrated a tendency to increase wages rather
than employment. Blair, Kruse, and Blasi (2000) found in a study of employee owned
firms (with at least 20% ownership) in US in 1983 that such firms had a statistically
significant lower variance in their annual percentage in employment than comparable,
conventional firms. 47 Furthermore, Bartlett et al. (1992) observed that among members,
cooperatives have lower quit rates, which has the benefit of allowing for “skill
accumulation and learning, which can improve firm productivity and profitability,
translating into higher earning for worker cooperative members.” 48 Critically, the job
security offered by cooperatives may provide a mechanism for mitigating unemployment
during economic recessions.
An additional, less tangible benefit of employee ownership is increased job
satisfaction. Evidence shows that workers are more satisfied with their jobs when they
have a voice in decision-making. Kruse et al. (2010) find that the positive relationship
between employee ownership and job satisfaction to be the result of the positive effects
of employee ownership on “training, freedom from supervision, rating of benefits, and
job security.” 49 Empirical evidence on employee ownership, particularly when paired
with decision-making participation as is present in cooperatives, thus not only provides
significant support to the idea that employee-owned firms offer economic benefits in

46

Ben Craig and John Pencavel. "The Objectives of Worker Cooperatives."Journal of Comparative
Economics 17, no. 2 (1993)
47
Blair, Kruse, Blasi (2000)
48
Artz and Kim (2011) pg. 21
49
Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi (2010) pg. 274
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terms of productivity, survival, and longevity, but they achieve these benefits while
furthering worker welfare.
It is important to emphasize that cooperative firm organization need not be limited
to small firms. The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation located in the Basque Country
of northern Spain defies all of the criticisms of cooperative organizations on a massive
scale. Founded in the mid-1950s, Mondragon cooperative firms “employed more than
83,000 full-time workers, and 15-20,000 part-time workers” as of 2011. 50 The
cooperative organization grew from a single producer cooperative into a network of 120
cooperative companies as well as being a part-owner of 75 subsidiaries in other countries.
And, in 2012, the organization had revenues over $16 billion and maintained assets of
$64 billion. 51 Remarkably, Mondragon has accomplished all of this while maintaining an
average ratio of 4.5/1 between its highest and lowest wages. Mondragon stands as an
exceptionally efficient and globally competitive cooperative success story. Its success
highlights the reality that worker-owned firm organization it not antithetical to firm
productivity, growth, and stability.
In light of empirical evidence of worker cooperative successes, some researchers
have attempted to explain worker cooperative scarcity in terms other than inefficiency.
Podivinsky and Stewart (2012) assessed panel data on UK manufacturing in an endeavor
to determine the reason for the relative rarity of labor-managed firms as compared to
capitalist firms. They found that the evidence “suggests that labour-managed firms
(LMFs) are relatively rare in market economies not because they are unable to survive as
long as their capitalist firm (CF) counterparts, but because they are created much less
50

Charles Sackrey, Geoffrey Eugene. Schneider, and Janet T. Knoedler.Introduction to Political Economy.
6th ed. Cambridge, MA: Dollars and Sense, Economic Affairs Bureau, 2010. pg. 265
51
Ibid.
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frequently.” 52 They determined that for a 0.1 unit increase in their measure of risk, there
is a corresponding 15% decrease in the likelihood of cooperative formation while there is
only a 2% decrease for conventional firms. And, a .01 increase in their capital intensity
measure produced an expected 26.7% decrease in cooperative formation but only a 9.4%
decrease for capitalist firms. 53 Perceptions of cooperative riskiness make finding
financing extremely difficult, which in turn, keeps cooperatives out of the market.
Furthermore, “traditional cooperative statutes [in the US] prohibit non-member
investment in cooperatives and limit the amount of return on equity,” which means that if
loans cannot be attained and potential employee-owners do not have independent ability
to finance the cooperative, other options for financing are limited. Dickstein (1991)
argues that the difference in prevalence of cooperatives in Europe and the US is
attributable to the more extensive institutional structure supportive of cooperative
development in Europe. 54
In light of the existing research on the impact of employee ownership and on
worker cooperative scarcity, I argue that worker cooperative scarcity exists not because
worker cooperatives are inefficient or short-lived, but rather because of a combination of
institutional factors. Public policy in the US neglects the worker cooperative
organizational form and no strong non-governmental source provides a support system
for worker cooperatives. Furthermore, the organizational form is at odds with hierarchical
norms that permeate the US.

52
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Methodology:
Because my approach to explaining both credit union and worker cooperative
scarcity is fundamentally institutional—as opposed to competitive—I use the theory of
institutional isomorphism developed by DiMaggio and Powell in “The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”
as a framework for understanding cooperative scarcity in the United States. I narrowly
focus on explaining the relative scarcity of credit unions—a specific form of consumer
cooperatives—as compared to for-profit commercial banks and on the virtual absence of
worker cooperatives from the American economy through the lens of DiMaggio and
Powell’s three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism. The three institutional forces
the authors identify are coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative
isomorphism, which I will discuss in turn.
Coercive isomorphism is explained by DiMaggio and Powell as the product of
“both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations
upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which
organizations function.” 55 Those pressures might be forceful, persuasive, or strongly
incentivizing. In particular, the two note that “in some circumstances organizational
change is a direct response to government mandate” and that “the existence of a common
legal environment affects many aspects of an organization’s behavior and structure.” 56
Indeed, the government is one of the most, if not the most, important organization other
organizations are dependent on because they define the rules of the game. The
importance of government mandate and legal environment is the component of coercive
55
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forces of isomorphism upon which I will most heavily rely in my explanation of credit
union scarcity and will also apply to worker cooperative scarcity.
Mimetic isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell argue, results from standard
responses to uncertainty. They assert that “uncertainty…is a powerful force that
encourages imitation. When organizational technologies are poorly understood…when
goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty,
organizations may model themselves on other organizations.” 57 A modeled
organization—the organization being imitated—“serves as a convenient source of
practices that the borrowing organization may use” often without any intention to do so. 58
Indeed, “models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer of
turnover, or explicitly by organizations such as consulting firms or industry trade
associations.” 59 Particularly successful firms operate as models often because
“organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they
perceive as to be more legitimate or successful.” 60 Importantly, the authors note that “the
ubiquity of certain kinds of structural arrangements can more likely be credited to the
universality of mimetic processes than to any concrete evidence that the adopted models
enhance efficiency.” 61 I find this conception of mimetic forces very useful in explaining
the scarcity of worker cooperatives in America in light of the shortcoming of economic
efficiency arguments.
Finally, normative isomorphism, “stems primarily from professionalization”
which DiMaggio and Powell define as “the collective struggle of members of an
57
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occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control ‘the production
of producers’…and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational
autonomy.” 62 They note that the struggle for self-directed professionalization is impeded
by the need for professionals to “compromise with nonprofessional clients, bosses, or
regulators.” 63 More important for the purposes of assessing cooperative scarcity in the
US, they observe that major growth among professions has been “among organizational
professionals, particularly managers and specialized staff of large organizations” which
produces greater conformity among this group of firm organizers. 64 Indeed, “while
various kinds of professionals within an organization may differ from one another, they
exhibit much similarity to their profession counterparts in other organizations.” 65
DiMaggio and Powell outline two aspects of professionalization as important sources of
isomorphism: “one is the resting of formal education and of legitimation in a cognitive
base produced by university specialists; the second is the growth and elaboration of
professional networks that span organizations and across which new models diffuse
rapidly.” 66 Normative forces, like mimetic forces, will primarily be used to explain
worker cooperative scarcity.
DiMaggio and Powell readily accept, as do I, that institutional mechanisms are
not solely responsible for organizational isomorphism, and thus exclusion, but operate in
conjunction with competitive sources of isomorphism. They concede that competitive
isomorphism, driven by “market competition, niche change, and fitness measures,” plays
a role in organizational isomorphism, but contend that “such a view…is most relevant for
62
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those fields in which free and open competition exists.” 67 Importantly, they introduce
their institutional mechanisms of isomorphism because while competition offers some
explanatory value, it “does not present a fully adequate picture of the modern world of
organizations.” 68 Supplementing an assessment of competitive isomorphism with an
assessment of institutional isomorphism allows us to acknowledge and account for the
reality that organizations “compete not just for resources and customers, but for political
power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well economic fitness;” it allows us to
account for ways in which organizational structure is induced—even coerced—that are
not explicitly economic. 69 And, this is precisely what I endeavor to do in applying
DiMaggio and Powell’s theory throughout this work; I do not intend to argue that
competitive forces are unimportant, but merely that they are not all-important.
As a final note on methodology, I find it pertinent to make clear that the
institutional forces discussed above do not all apply equally, or necessarily all apply,
across sectors. Thus, I find that coercive forces of isomorphism are largely responsible
for credit union scarcity, and discuss said scarcity exclusively in those terms, while I find
that all three mechanisms of isomorphism impact worker cooperative scarcity and discuss
worker cooperative scarcity in terms of all three.
Chapter Summaries
The body of this work is broken into three chapters that explore the institutional
reasons for credit union and worker cooperative scarcity in the United States through the
lens of DiMaggio and Powell’s three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism. The first
chapter is devoted to explaining the scarcity of credit unions in the United States. I argue
67
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in the chapter that, despite superior performance by several metrics, credit unions occupy
the small corner of the financial sector they do primarily due to mechanisms of coercive
isomorphism. Government regulation unique to credit unions limits their ability to grow,
take advantage of returns to scale, and provide better and more extensive services to
customers. This limitation simultaneously limits credit unions, on the demand side, from
providing as convenient of service as commercial banks and, thus, decreases demand for
credit unions.
My second chapter focuses on the role of mechanisms of coercive isomorphism in
contributing to worker cooperative scarcity in the US. I argue that public policy in the US
is at least somewhat responsible for worker cooperative scarcity. Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) dominate the field of employee ownership because, as a
government defined and endorsed form for employee ownership, they are better
understood than worker cooperatives and because they are tax-favored to provide firms
with incentives for adopting them. Thus, although worker cooperatives combine
ownership and employee participation to more reliably realize employee and firm
benefits, firms interested in employee ownership are likely to turn to ESOPs instead. I
contrast this impact of public policy with that of other countries that maintain similar
policy, but for worker cooperatives.
Finally, my third chapter is devoted to exploring the forces of mimetic and
normative isomorphism in contributing to worker cooperative scarcity. I argue that in the
US, worker cooperative scarcity begets worker cooperative scarcity. Standard responses
to uncertainty both encourage new entrants to the market to mimic the organizational
form of successful model organizations and create tangible costs for non-conforming
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firms, thus discouraging such non-conformity. Furthermore, prevailing norms—both
business professional and more general societal—promote hierarchical organization and
condition Americans to accept hierarchical workplaces as normal.
The scarcity of credit unions and worker cooperatives in the United States poses a
puzzle. Traditional explanations of their scarcity which rely on neo-classical models that
emphasize competition and profit-maximization do not adequately explain the
cooperative landscape in the country. It is my hope that his project will shed light on the
importance of institutional forces in providing supplemental explanatory value.

27

Chapter 1:
Credit Union Scarcity: Coercive Isomorphism
In 2010, the New York Times ran a piece entitled “Credit Unions Begin to
Promote Their Strengths”. As the title suggests, credit union strengths are nothing new,
but they have long gone unadvertised and underappreciated. In the wake of widespread
dissatisfaction and anger at big banks after the financial crisis and in response to sky-high
interest rates and exorbitant over-draft fees, however, some credit unions began to step
forward and promote their advantages over for-profit banks. America’s First Federal
Credit Union in Birmingham, Alabama, was one such bank. They launched a series of
commercials in which “bankers” confess to charging a lot of unnecessary fees simply to
boost their pay-checks. 70 In contrast, the credit union positions itself as a preferable and
profitable alternative. The point that the commercials articulate is that there are more
consumer-friendly products available in the banking market—products with lower
interest rates for borrowing and higher rates of return for savings. But surely it is not
simply a lack of marketing that explains the scarcity of credit union membership. Given
their superior performance, it is striking that credit unions command as little of the
market as they do and begs the question of why credit union use is really so scarce,
relative to commercial bank use.
I argue that credit unions scarcity is somewhat attributable to characteristic
endogenous to credit union norms, but that it is primarily the consequence of mechanisms
of coercive isomorphism active in government policy. Credit unions are subject to unique
regulatory burdens that limit their size and scope, ultimately leading to them being
70
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comparatively less convenient than commercial banks. Effectively, there are both supply
and demand side reasons for scarcity resulting from forces of coercive isomorphism that
privilege commercial banks; public policy limits the ability of credit unions to supply
banking services, which in turn decreases demand for credit unions. The chapter proceeds
in the following manner: I first provide a brief history of credit unions and their structure;
next I illustrate the superior performance of credit unions relative to commercial banks in
the US; I then articulate the endogenous and coercive institutional reasons for scarcity
and substantiate my claims with empirical evidence.
Brief History of Credit Unions and Their Structure
Credit unions are unique from commercial banks in important ways, including in
their historical purpose, organizational form, and regulatory burdens. These differences
are central to explaining why credit unions are so scarce relative to their commercial
counterparts and thus justify a brief exploration of the history of credit unions in America
and their distinguishing characteristics.
The earliest credit union in America dates to 1909 in New Hampshire. In the same
year, Massachusetts passed the Massachusetts Credit Union Act. 71 The impetus for credit
union formation came in response to a lack of affordable credit for working-class families
who typically were forced to turn to loan sharks charging exorbitant interest rates. The
popularity of the institutions spread and credit union proliferation following these initial
start-ups was remarkable. In 1934, after a number of states had already passed state-level
credit union acts, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Federal Credit Union Act
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into law, creating a national system to charter and supervise federal credit unions. 72
Since that time, credit unions in the United States have offered banking services to
members at rates typically advantageous to those offered by for-profit competitors.
Critically, credit unions increased their reach over time as the requirements for
membership eligibility have changed to become more inclusive; while credit unions
initially required membership in somewhat narrowly defined group, they now often
require only that an individual live in the township or county served by a credit union.
Thus, although individuals are not eligible to join any credit union due to the “common
bond” requirement—which will be discussed in detail later—most people are eligible to
join at least one credit union.
Given the cooperative structure of credit unions, the goals of credit unions differ
significantly from those of for-profit banks. As consumer banking cooperatives, credit
unions are owned and controlled by the individuals who use the institutions’ services. In
US credit unions, “consumer deposits or ‘shares’ fund the organization” and “each
member is accorded one vote on credit union matters and decisions regardless of the size
of the members’ accounts.” 73 Loans to members are made from member deposits. The
result of this type of member ownership is that the goals of the owners are, inevitably, the
very same as the goals of the consumers—the depositors and borrowers. In contrast,
commercial banks are organized as investor-owned corporations in which “determination
of deposit-taking and lending practices is made by outside owners whose objective is
maximization of ownership (equity) value.” 74 Thus, while profits at commercial banks
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are distributed to owners, gains at credit unions are employed to maximize member
benefit by providing the best rates possible. Any income net expenses is used to
capitalize the institution to protect against loan losses and distributed to members as
dividends.
Superior Credit Union Performance
The theoretical purpose of credit unions is well-established to be to offer better
rates and service to its members, and based on organizational theory it makes sense that
they would indeed be capable of doing so. But, in practice, just how well do credit unions
in the US measure up to their for-profit, investor-owned banking counterparts? For 21
years in a row, until 2005, the American Banker newspaper performed a consumer
satisfaction survey of banks, thrifts, and credit unions in which credit unions came in first
every single year. 75 And, Allred and Addams (2000), in a survey targeting credit union
and bank customers, found that “in all areas of service quality, credit union customers
rate credit union service quality higher than bank customers rate bank service quality.” 76
These polls reflect the greater satisfaction of credit union customers relative to bank
customers, a superior satisfaction rooted in superior performance in several metrics. Not
only do credit unions typically offer better rates for depositors and borrowers, they also
demonstrated themselves to be more resilient during the recent financial crisis and to be a
more reliable source of credit in the wake of the financial crisis.
Using data compiled by Datatrac, Inc., an independent company that tracks the
interest rates and terms at financial institutions nationwide, the National Credit Union
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Administration produced charts that compare the national average rates for 23 common
loan and deposit products at banks and credit unions (as well as the same rates prevailing
at banks that converted from credit unions). 77 The charts reveal that on the vast majority
of products, credit unions offer favorable rates relative to their for-profit counterparts.
The latest report, from September 2013, is reproduced on the following page and
illustrates the difference in product rates. Taken together, they demonstrate that, on
average, credit unions overwhelmingly offer better rates for the majority of products.
Three financial products—30 year fixed rate mortgage, 15 year fixed rate mortgage, and
5½ year adjustable rate mortgage—are offered at marginally better rates at banks.
Importantly, these rates are comparable with the prevailing averages in other quarterly
reports and in the annual reports that pre-date the financial crisis and the recession.
In addition to offering favorable rates to members, credit unions demonstrated
their relative resiliency during the financial crisis. Between the start of 2008 through the
end of 2010, there were 366 bank failures in the United States. 78 During the same 3 year
period, credit unions also suffered; 52 credit unions closed. But, measured as a
percentage, these 52 credit unions represent a failure rate much less substantial than that
of banks, because there are, in fact, a greater number of credit unions in the US than there
are banks (not in brick and mortar presence, but in central organization). 79 The primary
reason the credit union sector survived the financial crisis much less scathed than banks is
that credit unions were much less likely to take part in the risky loans that many for-profit
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banks engaged with. This results from the difference in goals between credit unions and
commercial banks; while commercial banks sought profits—irresponsibly, as we know
retrospectively—most credit unions were simply focused on best serving their
membership base and balancing the interests of their savers and borrowers. When it came
to issuing bad mortgages, credit unions were less likely to do so because they were not
trying to profit maximize but rather produce the best risk-adjusted rates they could for
their members.
A final measure of US credit union performance relative to for-profit banks can
be found in their propensity to loan. Particularly in the wake of the financial crisis, credit
union loaning continued to be a significant source of credit while banks actually
substantially restricted their loaning. Between 2007 and 2008, loans granted by credit
unions in the United States increased by 6.68 percent in volume. 80 During the same time
period, loans granted by traditional banks actually decreased by 0.39 percent. 81 And, in
2009 credit unions continued to increase their loan volume, although by a smaller 1.2
percent. 82 It is important to also note that although the rate of increase declined in 2009,
the loans issued by credit unions were more productive than those issued by banks; the
growth of productive loans 83 for credit unions reached 11 percent while productive loans
from for-profit banks decreased by 15 percent. 84 The implication of this last comparison
is important; not only were credit unions generating more loans than banks on the whole,
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they were producing the type of loans important for battling the recession and
unemployment while banks were substantially deceasing such loans.
Given this backdrop—preferable rates, greater resilience and stability, and more
reliable lending in the wake of the financial crisis and amidst the recession—it would
seem reasonable to expect credit union use to be quite common. Reasonable, but wrong.
As of 2011, US credit unions served only 93 million members, held 10 percent of savings
deposits, made 9 percent of all consumer loans, and made 13.2 percent of nonrevolving
consumer loans. 85 Meanwhile the four largest commercial banks in the US—JP Morgan
Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo—control combined assets of
roughly $7.9 trillion. These same four banks maintain roughly 20,000 branches
combined. The credit union presence is dwarfed by just these four, without considering
the role of other large and small commercial banks in the US financial market. Indeed,
even if credit unions performed only at the same level as for-profit banks, these numbers
would be surprising. But, given the superior performance of credit unions, it is all the
more striking. I now turn to explanation of the organizationally endogenous and coercive
institutional reasons for credit scarcity.
Endogenous Sources of Scarcity
A partial explanation for the relatively small number credit union share of the
banking market is that credit unions fail to market as aggressively as their competitors.
As the New York Times article suggests, credit unions are not known for innovative or
compelling advertising. Indeed, credit unions typically market themselves using
conservative, often dated approaches such as paper pamphlets promoting rates in a rather
85
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bland manner. So, while credit unions rely on their competitive rates selling themselves
many commercial banks engage in aggressive and innovative advertising, seeking new
and more effective ways to tap clients.
Largely, this difference may be attributed to institutional form. While banks are
for-profit institutions primarily seeking to maximize profits for their investor-owners,
credit unions are non-profit organizations with the primary goal of creating consumer
loans and other financial products at a price best for members. As one credit union expert
explains, “it’s more than profit versus nonprofit. It’s about philosophy and purpose.
Banks are about profit which satisfies owners, directors, and/or shareholders. Credit
unions are about providing low-cost services to its owner-members in a nonprofit
environment.” 86 As such, credit unions are less aggressive in expanding their
membership base, because their primary goal is to serve the current membership, not
increase profits or membership. As Fountain (2007) observes, “since credit unions are
not-for-profit institutions, the motivation for strategic and financial growth differs from
for-profit businesses; however, credit unions must make some profit in order to provide
for additional services which meets or exceeds those of competitors.” 87 Thus, while credit
unions need to ensure that they are economically viable in the future, there is less impetus
to increase membership and net profits as long as the credit union is achieving sufficient
gains to pass along preferable rates to members.
A Rand survey conducted in 2009 provides some support for this view. The
survey finds a lack of consumer knowledge about what credit unions do and who is
eligible to become a member, which may be the consequence of poor or limited
86

Wendell V. Fountain The Credit Union World: Theory, Process, Practice--: Cases & Application.
Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2007. Kindle. Kindle Locations 1663-1665
87
Ibid. Kindle Locations 653-655

35

institutional promotion. Of bank users who responded that they would not consider
switching to a credit union if they had to switch institutions, the most oft cited reason was
“a lack of knowledge about the services provided by credit union” while the second most
often cited reason was convenience. Moreover, bank users were notably more likely than
credit union users to believe that “credit union members must belong to a labor union,
credit unions lack data security, and credit unions offer limited services.” 88
Interestingly, though, a lack of knowledge about what credit unions are capable of
and who is an eligible member do not seem to be the primary barrier to credit union
membership—convenience, or inconvenience, does. The Rand survey cited above finds
that “consumer selection of financial service providers is based primarily on convenience
of branches, convenience of ATMs, and bank fees.” 89 The survey found that bank users
tend to be more focused on convenience issues while credit union users are more
interested in fees, which is telling about the limitations on convenience placed on credit
union by regulatory burdens.
In practice, most former bank users who switched to a credit union cited “fees,
free checking, and better service as primary reasons for the switch,” reinforcing the fact
that service performance at credit unions tends to be better than at banks. 90 And,
similarly, of credit union users who actually switched to a bank, those who did so for a
reason other than a move—which were the majority—cited convenience as the primary
reason for their decision. These consumer responses suggest that the biggest barrier to
credit union membership is not a lack of awareness or a lack of desirability, but rather a
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matter of access and convenience. The common bond and other regulatory burdens on
credit unions restrict their reach, and thus their ability to grow to support multi-branch
convenience for members. Therefore, I proceed to argue that forces of coercive
isomorphism in credit union and banking regulation are largely to blame for credit union
scarcity.
Coercive Isomorphism: The Common Bond and Financial Services Regulation
A defining characteristic of credit unions is the concept of the “common bond”.
Credit unions “cannot do business with the general public due to charter limitations based
on serving a membership that is characterized by a common bond…based on occupation,
association [such as a fraternal or religious organization], or residence.” 91 The residence
requirement is more narrowly defined as “a well-defined neighborhood, community, or
rural district.” 92 The origin of the common bond finds its place in the assumption that a
banking institution in which close ties between members is required will offer solutions
to information asymmetries in lending. The common bond requirement “was seen as the
cement that united credit union members in a cooperative venture, and was, therefore,
thought important to credit unions’ continued success.” 93 And, the common bond was
historically—and still is today, to some extent—considered “advantageous because it can
reduce the cost of assessing the creditworthiness of potential borrowers and thereby
facilitate unsecured lending on reasonable terms to the credit union’s members.” 94
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Since the federal legislation of credit unions in 1934, the domain of the common
bond has developed quite dramatically. In the early years of credit unions, interpretation
of the common bond was rather restrictive. Indeed, most credit unions formed as single
occupational unions. However, in the 1970s there began a “less restrictive interpretation
of the common bond requirement for membership, which created new opportunities for
growth and merger.” 95 Perhaps most notably, in 1982 the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) “ruled that a single credit union could serve employees of
multiple employers even when not all employers were engaged in the same industrial
activity.” 96 The dilution of the common bond requirement in this way offered credit
unions the opportunity to enlarge their membership base and size. The American Bankers
Association (ABA), understanding the market threat posed by expanding credit union
base, filed suit, challenging the permissibility of the multiple common bond under the
1934 legislation. And, in 1998 the Supreme Court found in favor of the ABA, concluding
that the practice of allowing multiple common bonds in one credit union was not
permitted by the 1934 Act. 97 In quick response to the Court’s decision, Congress passed,
and President Clinton signed, the Credit Union Membership Act, “which authorized
individual credit unions to serve multiple groups, within some restrictions.” 98
This was a big victory for credit unions. As one credit union expert explains:
“1998 was the watershed year at the federal level in legislation regarding credit unions.
President Bill Clinton signed the Credit Union Membership Access Act into law on
August 7, 1998, despite the efforts of the powerful banking and lobbying interests which
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had lined up fiercely against the credit union movement-industry.” 99 Importantly, though,
while the 1998 Act loosens the common bond, it certainly does not eliminate it; as long
as the common bond persists, it imposes restrictions on credit union size and, thus, the
number of people credit unions can serve and the types of services they can offer.
As technology advances enable credit-reporting agencies to provide reliable
creditworthiness information, the dilution of the original common bond requirements are
perhaps not very dangerous. Indeed, “because of the low cost and ease with which
lenders can gather consumer creditworthiness information, and the repayment incentive
their presence provides, the relative advantages of creditworthiness knowledge gained by
maintaining direct contact with the borrower through a common bond and the motivation
to repay produced by common bond relationships are reduced.” Thus, while the common
bond restriction on membership once served a very legitimate purpose in the credit union
structure, it now seems to act as a limiting factor on credit unions’ ability to grow and
offer services to a broader consumer base. Walter (2006) observes that the 1934 Act, with
its restrictive common bond requirements, “essentially predicted that such a huge credit
union would not have been a safe and sound financial institution, nor consequently a
viable one in the long run” and expresses his skepticism that this remains true. 100
In addition to the common bond restriction on credit unions, other regulatory
burdens have historically limited credit unions’ ability to broadly meet consumer wants.
In particular, regulation regarding what types of financial services credit unions are
permitted to offer has historically limited credit union market share, and continues to do
so. In their early iterations, credit unions offered, almost exclusively, small-value,
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unsecured consumer lending while other financial institutions offered large-scale loans.
Prior to amendments to the Federal Credit Union Act in 1977, “federal credit unions were
limited to providing short-term mortgage loans such as second mortgages and mobile
home loans.” 101 While most credit unions now offer long-term home loans, this is the
direct result of easing of regulation on the matter. Importantly, such easing has not taken
place for all financial products credit unions want to offer. In particular, credit unions are
not a substantial source of business loans. Although credit unions have expanded their
service and product offering greatly over time, the 1998 Credit Union Membership
Access Act actively limits the ability of credit unions to lend to businesses at 12.25
percent of the credit union’s total assets. 102 Undoubtedly this cap limits the clientele who
turn to banks for business loans and, in this manner, restricts credit union assets.
The maintenance of the common bond and other restrictions on credit unions has
not been the result passive negligence, but largely the result of banking industry lobbying
done by the American Bankers Association. The ABA did not only come into play during
the relaxation of the common bond in the 1990s. The ABA actively seeks to keep the
functional abilities of credit unions limited, arguing that if the common bond is dismissed
or credit unions offer more diverse financial products that credit unions are no longer
acting like credit unions and cannot be regulated as such, thus intrinsically linking credit
union continuation with common bond and other regulation. 103 The ABA is a very
powerful lobby with extensive resources and it appears that their work to limit credit
union de-regulation is quite successful, despite the reality that the most distinguishing
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characteristics of credit unions have not to do with the common bond and the specific
financial services they provide, but with the ownership scheme, democratic operation,
and prioritization of member service over profit maximization.
Empirical Evidence of Common Bond and Regulatory Impact
There is substantial evidence that common bond restrictions have a meaningful
impact on the performance of credit unions. In the wake of the relaxation of the common
bond in 1982—and more decidedly in 1998—credit union growth witnessed a marked
increase. Adjusted for inflation, “the average credit union held 6.5 times more assets in
2006 than the average credit union in 1985.” 104 A great deal of this increase in size is
attributed to the Credit Union Membership Act of 1998 for facilitating consolidation of
credit unions. Support for this position is found in the fact that during the period of
growth in size of credit unions, there occurred a simultaneous sharp decline in the
number of credit unions and marked increase in the number of credit unions characterized
by multiple common bonds. 105
This should not be surprising. There is strong precedent in the experience of
commercial banks in the 1990s for expecting de-regulation to encourage financial
institutes to take advantage of economies of scales. Changes in banking regulation
allowed commercial banks to grow into the national mega-banks we know today.
Colomiris and Haber (2014) explain that the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 knocked down the last barriers to interstate banking
and allowed banks to combine into national banking systems. 106 This legislation allowed
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for, even encouraged, the creation of JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and the other
mega-banks in America while credit unions remain limited in their reach.
There are several explanations offered by economists for the tendency in credit
union growth. A number of studies have found an inverse relationship between average
operating expenses and credit union size. 107 Importantly, it appears that cost advantages
of larger credit unions have grown with time, which suggests an increasing incentive
towards consolidation and growth of credit unions into larger institutions, when
possible. 108 Additionally, there is evidence that “larger credit unions have more
opportunities for diversification into nontraditional product lines, such as business loans,
credit cards, and mutual funds and that doing so has reduced the volatility of their
earnings while providing their members with additional services.” 109 Wheelock and
Wilson (2011) find “substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale among credit
unions of all sizes, suggesting that further consolidation and growth among credit unions
are likely,” but are careful to point out that further relaxation of legal restrictions on
credit union membership and permissible activities will play a large role in the extent of
this growth. 110
This conclusion is supported by Goddard et al. (2002) who found that “the ratio of
actual to potential membership available to the credit union given the coverage of its
common bond is also an important determinant of growth…credit unions close to
contrast with the regulatory position of credit unions, the authors argue that this was a potentially
positive change that might have allowed for a stable banking system that could offset losses in some
regions with gains in others. I would like to suggest that credit unions could benefit equally from the
ability to build such a national system, and would likely do so in a more responsible way than the
commercial banks that failed in 2007 did.
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exhausting their potential membership face difficultly sustaining strong growth
performance.” 111 Goddard et al. conclude that “common bond coverage does appear to
impose a significant constraint on credit union growth.” 112 If credit unions are restricted
by the common bond requirement from achieving the same type of economies of scale as
their commercial bank competitors, it is unsurprising that they operate on a small and,
thus, less convenient scale than those competitors.
Non-common bond regulations discussed in the previous section also
demonstrates tangible limitation of credit unions. Restrictions on what financial products
credit unions can offer limit their customer base. Above, the “permissible activities”
referenced by Goddard et al. primarily pertains to the proposal to increase credit unions’
abilities to lend up to 27.5 percent of their total assets rather than the current 12.25
percent. Indeed, Senator Mark Udall of Colorado has introduced legislation to do just that
on several occasions with the intent of freeing up credit union lending. Proponents of the
change argue that the current cap limits small business’ access to necessary credit; they
claim that passage of the bill would “free up credit unions to make up to $13 billion in
new loans to small businesses in just the first year.” 113 As of yet, although the bill has
been introduced in the House as well, it has yet to garner the level of support necessary to
become law and is heavily opposed by the ABA, as they view business lending as outside
the proper functions of a credit union (despite the fact that credit unions have historically
played an important role in small business finance.
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Conclusion
The influence of coercive isomorphism in privileging banks over cooperative
alternatives is not new in American history, although it has not always been intentional.
Due to extreme bank instability in the first half of the 19th century—largely due to
information asymmetries leading to bad lending decisions—cooperatively owned mutual
savings banks were more popular choices; by 1880 mutual savings banks held close to 90
percent of saving while commercial banks only held about 10 percent. 114 A remarkable
shift took place in the last decade of the century, however, when “bank regulation was
introduced to contain commercial bank risk-taking, and derivatively, to reduce depositor
paranoia about risks to their deposits.” 115 By 1925, this shift allowed investor-owned
banks to increase market share to roughly half and in 1934 the Banking Act of 1933
granted commercial banks deposit insurance, making them preferable to cooperative
banking options without such protection. 116 This regulation paired with the restrictiveness
of the common bond until the 1970s undoubtedly played a role in the evolving
composition of the financial market in the country. And, it is hard to make up lost
ground, particularly in the face continual disadvantage.
Credit unions in the United States differ in very significant ways from the
commercial banks that dominate the financial sector. While recent history has
demonstrated the reckless ends for-profit banks will go to in attempts to profit maximize,
it simultaneously demonstrated how effectively credit unions avoid such behavior by
sticking to their mission of providing the best service possible to their member-owners.
But, despite superior performance, credit unions are relatively scarce when compared
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with commercial banks and many fewer Americans use credit union services than
commercial banking services. While some part of credit union scarcity is the result of
characteristics endogenous to credit unions, it is more attributable to the consequences of
public policy. Mechanisms of coercive isomorphism in the form of public policy function
to both limit the size and scope of credit union operation while advantaging that of
commercial banks; regulatory burdens unique to credit unions prevent them from taking
advantage of economies of scale as well as commercial banks, often limiting their ability
to offer the type of convenience commercial banks do, and disallow them from
participating in potential markets.
In the wake of the financial crisis and commercial bank irresponsibility and
failure, credit unions have gained prominence and popularity. They represent a favorable
alternative in terms of rates, stability, and financial responsibility in the absence of heavy
regulation and oversight (as a result of their nature and goals). But, without further
relaxation of the common bond and increasing ability to offer greater financial services,
credit unions will be forced to continue to be small, relatively inconvenient, and less fullservice alternatives to commercial banks. In short, without a change in the mechanisms of
coercive isomorphism, credit unions will likely continue to occupy only a small portion
of the financial market in the United States.
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Chapter 2:
Worker Cooperative Scarcity Part I: Coercive Isomorphism
An interesting paradox exists in the United States: while worker cooperatives are
remarkably scarce, employee ownership is not. In the United States, before the mid1970s, employee ownership was a rare event. A highly limited number of worker
cooperatives existed as isolated incidences of such ownership arrangements. Since that
time, a great transformation in the landscape of ownership took place. Today, more than
one in 6 private sector employees in the US own shares in their company and more than
one in 12 maintain their ownership in the form of participation in an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP). A remarkable 10 million employees participate in more than
9,000 ESOPs with the net value of employee holdings in excess of $600 billion. 117 The
dramatic growth of employee ownership in the US, notably, is concentrated in the form
of ESOPs, not in other organizational forms of employee ownership such as worker
cooperatives. This pattern in the organization of employee ownership begs the question
of why, despite clearly gaining popularity, employee ownership has so narrowly taken the
form of ESOPs.
I argue that the answer to this query can be located within DiMaggio and Powell’s
theory of organizational isomorphism. Coercive forces of isomorphism in the form of
government policy favor ESOPs over cooperative ownership. The spike in employee
ownership began after the introduction of ESOPs in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Despite rewards of employee ownership being contingent
on more than simple financial interest in a firm, employee ownership persists in taking
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the form of ESOPs rather than worker cooperatives because ESOPs are institutionally
privileged in ways which cooperatives are not. The chapter proceeds in the following
manner: I first outline what Employee Stock Ownership Plans are and where they
originated; I then take a close look at ESOP performance and compare their performance
with that of worker cooperatives; next I explain the tax policy form of the coercive forces
of isomorphism encouraging ESOPs; and, lastly, I compare US forces privileging ESOPs
to similar forces in other countries that apply to cooperatives.
Defining Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are, most fundamentally, a form of
pension plan for the employees of an enterprise. While ESOPs operate as a retirement
fund in much the same way as other defined contribution pension plans articulated in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)—i.e. 401(k)s—do they also differ in
several noteworthy ways. Generally speaking, defined contribution plans are
characterized by individual employee accounts, which are funded by employee
contributions, employer contributions, or some combination of the two. The contributions
to these accounts are typically invested on the employee’s behalf and upon cashing in on
their personal account an employee will receive the balance of their account, which is
based on contributions plus or minus investment gains or losses. 118
One of the fundamental differences between ESOPS and other defined
contribution pension plans is that ESOPS “invest primarily in the sponsoring
corporation’s equity securities, whereas other pension funds cannot hold more than 10%
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of their assets in the sponsoring firm’s securities.” 119 A second important difference is
that ESOPs can borrow funds for the purchase of the stock for the plan while other
pension plans are prohibited from doing so under ERISA. 120 The latter, known as
leveraged ESOPs, make up a substantial number of the ESOPs created since their
introduction in ERISA. Leveraged ESOPs are popular because they can effectively be
used for company financing; an ESOP trust is formed which can then borrow money
from a lending institution for the purpose of acquiring the sponsoring firm’s stock, which
effectively amounts to a loan to the firm. 121
An additional peculiarity of ESOPs is the particular nature employee ownership is
required to take. During their employment, while employees have shares in the company,
those shares do not come with control rights. The ESOP is held in trust and the controlled
by an appointed trustee. Therefore, even if an ESOP constitutes majority employee
ownership (which is atypical to begin with) the employees do not exercise majority
control under ESOP provisions.
The Origin of ESOP Policy
The historical development of the ESOP is quite pertinent to our understanding of
employee ownership. The concept of the ESOP originated with Louis Kelso, a securities
lawyer with a prominent San Francisco law firm, and was brought to legislative fruition
though Kelso’s partnership with Senator Russell Long, the chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee from 1966 to 1981. 122 Kelso authored an extensive body of economic
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theory that he considered a challenge to conventional economics of the time 123 —around
the 1950s—and “the key to the survival of capitalism.” 124 He identified two primary
problems with the prevailing form of capitalism: the increasing concentration of capital in
the hands of the few and the high level of taxation on productive members of society for
distribution to nonproductive members. He attributed these afflictions of capitalism to
“traditional capital financing methods that conditioned the acquisition of new capital on
the ownership of existing capital, thus creating a ‘spiraling concentration’ of capital
ownership and providing the political incentive for the New Deal welfare legislation.” 125
He posited that the solution to these contingent problems was, thus, to restructure the
system of capital financing; he envisioned a system in which ordinary workers would
have the opportunity to become a capitalist himself, at least to a degree. And, by making
the everyday citizen a capitalist, he believed capitalism would be revitalized.
More specifically, Kelso’s endeavor to find a program for re-structuring the
capital finance system to support new capitalists led him to produce and advocate
employee investment plans “backed by the sponsoring employer’s credit, which could
borrow money to finance investment through the purchase of the employer’s stock.” 126
As the employer paid off the loan for the purchase of company stock, the employees in
whose name the stock was purchased would become the beneficial owners of the stock
allocated to their account in the investment plan. In 1957, well before ESOP legislation
was enacted, Kelso crafted the first of these plans for Peninsula Newspapers, Inc., and the
concept spread slowly.
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In 1973, Kelso became associated with Senator Long, the conservative chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee at the time, which sparked the push for ESOP
legislation. Meeting for dinner in Washington, Kelso articulated his vision for expanding
capital ownership to ordinary workers. Reportedly, Long asked Kelso, “‘Are you saying
that [these financing methods] can make haves out of have-nots without taking it away
from the haves?’” and, upon Kelso responding in the affirmative, stated “‘That’s the kind
of populism I can buy.’” 127 Long’s conversion to Kelso’s proposal—which reconciled the
Senator’s populist origins with his capitalist convictions—brought the concept for the
ESOP into the political arena at a time that could hardly have been better.
In the early 1970s, Congress was in the midst of dealing with questions regarding
the future solvency of Social Security. A comprehensive survey conducted in the 1967
regarding the solvency issue “revealed that one out of 17 Americans were then eligible
for Social Security benefits, but that by the year 2000 one out of every three Americans
would be eligible and that by the year 2010 it would be one out of two.” 128 What was to
become ERISA was under consideration by the Senate to address this shortfall in Social
Security benefits, and Kelso “argued that the proposed legislation presented a practical
opportunity to engraft his financing scheme onto the existing statutory authorization for
stock bonus plans.” 129 Kelso and Long claimed that “employee ownership builds
commitment, which leads to productivity and profits, and argued that legislation
facilitating broader-based ownership would not only increase corporate performance, but
also ease workplace tensions, reduce disparities of wealth, and help build a better
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society.” 130 Indeed, his argument for the inclusion of ESOPs in the legislation prevailed
with the support and sponsorship of Long. The inclusion of the ESOP in the 1974
legislation is far from the end of its history. After its initial introduction in ERISA,
“Senator Long secured the passage of some twenty-five bills promoting and elaborating
upon this original ESOP legislation.” 131
The success of ESOP legislation, although largely attributable to the collaboration
between Kelso and Long, certainly speaks to the rising popularity of employee ownership
around the 70s and 80s; it reflects not merely the hard work of a few to enshrine their
personal ideology in law, but the general support for mechanisms for increasing
employee ownership. Importantly, while employee ownership enjoyed fairly widespread
popularity, the specific form which employee ownership took in the ESOP is the work of
Kelso and Long. And, their project was to create a “vehicle for broadening capital
ownership, not a means of industrial democracy.” 132 Thus, ESOP legislation focuses
narrowly on ownership and is actually rather undemocratic in structure. For instance, the
“ESOP provisions engrafted on ERISA place control of employer stock in the hands of a
trustee who is ordinarily appointed by the employer’s board of directors” rather than
placing control directly in the hands of the employees. 133 Furthermore, while employed
with the company in question, employees enjoy only beneficial ownership in the
employer stock, meaning they do not receive typical shareholder rights.

130

Freeman (2007) pg. 3
Murphy (2005) pg. 658
132
Ibid. pg. 658
133
Ibid. pg. 659
131

51

Comparing ESOP and Worker Cooperative Performance
The prominence of employee ownership in the form of ESOPs, and my claim that
this results from favorable public policy treatment, justifies an examination of ESOP
performance both independent of and relative to that of worker cooperatives; could it be
that ESOP use is simply highly effective, indeed more effective than worker
cooperatives, and that this is the root of their dominance of employee ownership? The
empirical evidence strongly suggests that this is not the case. As Murphy (2005)
observes: “A central irony of the ESOP, thirty years after its recognition in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, is that it has succeeded best where it has been
used in participatory ways for which it was never intended and is poorly designed.” 134
ESOPs have demonstrated to be effective in increasing firm performance,
employee morale, and employee benefits, but primarily achieve such results when they
constitute close to 100 percent employee-ownership and are employed in conjunction
with employee participation schemes. In this sense, ESOPs appear to be most effective
when they more resemble cooperative organizations than merely a form of pension
plan. 135 And, cooperatives still tend to outperform their ESOP counterparts in many
instances. A closer examination of the empirical research emerging out of the forty years
of ESOP history helps clarify this generalization.
There are undoubtedly demonstrated gains possible from ESOP adoption for the
employees, the firms, and even non-employee shareholders. With regards to employee
benefits, for instance, “Blasi et al. (1996) found 8% higher average compensation levels
134
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among public companies in which broad-based employee ownership plans held at least
5% of company stock.” 136 Additionally, studies conducted in both Massachusetts and
Washington State measuring the relative levels of pay and benefits for ESOP and nonESOP firms found no substantial differences in pay, indicating that ownership does not
substitute for current income or benefits but rather acts as a bonus in addition to current
pay and benefits. 137 Not only does compensation in ESOP firms reflect employee
benefits, but Blair et al. (2000) found that “firms holding more than 17% of company
stock over the 1983-95 period had significantly longer average employee tenure than
matched firms without ownership,” demonstrating greater job security among ESOP
firms. 138 Finally, some studies demonstrate increased job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, and motivation associated with ESOP adoption, but the evidence on the
subject is mixed.
The consistent point of divergence about whether or not ESOP adoption
influences these latter employee experiences is not the size of the ESOP, which one may
expect, but rather the pairing of increased employee participation in the firms along with
ESOP adoption. 139 Employee ownership in ESOPs does appear to positively impact
employees, and thus may provide a partial explanation for ESOP dominance, but the
evidence regarding employee experience at firms suggests that, besides compensation,
other benefits are not primarily the result of ESOP adoption, but rather, associated with
participatory policy adoption observed in inclusive ESOPs, not exclusive ESOPs. And,
while employee considerations are important in understanding ESOP adoption, firm
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consideration is almost inevitably more so; a look at the impact of ESOPs on firm
performance may provide better insight into why ESOP adoption dominates employee
ownership.
A great deal of ESOP research reveals “robust, positive, firm-level effects”
associated with productivity, profitability, and longevity, but while the effects are wellestablished, the causal mechanisms by which the effects are produced are less certain. 140
Performing a meta-analysis of 11 studies evaluating comparison of firm performance
before and after ESOP adoption, ESOP to non-ESOP firms, or post-adoption
performance of ESOP firms to matched non-ESOP firms, Kruse and Blasi (1997)
conclude that “on average in all the performance categories, ESOP companies do better
per year than non-ESOP companies and that companies do better post-adoption than preadoption” by approximately 4 percent annually. 141 Employee ownership is not only
associated with increased productivity, but also with greater firm stability. Park, Kruse
and Sesil (2004) tracked the survival rates for all public companies in the US between
1988 and 2001 and found that companies that were 5 percent or more employee-owned
were only 76 percent as likely to disappear as firms without employee ownership. 142 Blair
et al. (2000) found corroborating results studying the survival rates for public firms with
substantial employee-ownership between 1983 and 1995; their results revealed that
substantial employee-ownership increased the survival rates by about 20 percent. 143 And,
in an ongoing project, “Blasi and Kruse (2007) track all privately held companies with
ESOPs in 1988, and found they had similarly higher survival rates than closely matched
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companies without ESOPs.” 144 Employee ownership, although associated with better
firm performance, does not appear to be enough on its own to explain the success of
ESOP programs, for not all ESOPs are created equal.
Indeed, empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that employee
participation, paired with ownership is determinate of benefits of employee ownership.
Quarrey and Rosen (1993) found “significantly higher post-adoption growth for ESOP
companies that had participation groups and for ESOP companies in which management
perceived higher worker influence.” 145 In line with this conclusion, a U.S. Government
Accountability Office report in 1987 “found significant increases in productivity where
the companies reported high levels of worker influence, but only when the companies
reported an increase in employee voting rights or worker influence after adoption.” 146
Demonstrating that these conclusions are broadly true, Kruse (2002) reviewed the
conclusions from 31 published studies on employee attitudes and behavior under
employee ownership found one of the key conclusions to be that “increasing employee
participation and influence can make greater use of employee skills and knowledge, and
may be an important complement of employee ownership that can improve attitudes and
performance.” 147 Thus, it appears that ESOP benefits are not simply a result of giving
employees a stake in the company that employs them—essentially correcting for any
principle-agent problem—but rather the result of a combination of ownership and
participation. While it is difficult to assess the relative importance of financial stake and
employee participation, inclusive ESOPs demonstrate rewards from employee ownership
144
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that exclusive ESOPs do not because the latter neglect the importance of giving
employees a voice in the workplace in conjunction with ownership.
Cooperative enterprises ought to achieve, by their very nature, precisely this
winning combination of ownership and participation. Given the similarity between
inclusive ESOPs and worker cooperatives, we should expect worker cooperatives to
outperform exclusive ESOPs as inclusive ESOPs do. The evidence on worker cooperative
performance indeed supports this. Craig et al. (1995) demonstrated that worker
cooperatives in the US plywood industry are between 6 and 14 percent more efficient
than their more traditional counterparts with regard to output, holding inputs constant. 148
Bartlett et al. (1992) found higher value-added per worker, indicating higher productivity,
among cooperative workers in a comparison of Italian worker cooperatives in light
manufacturing with similar, similarly sized private firms in the same sector and region. 149
And, Doucouliagos (1995), studying labor-managed firms found that they maintain
“stronger positive correlation with productivity than firms where workers only participate
in control” supporting the notion that both ownership and participation are necessary for
employee involvement to be most effective. 150 The more consistent productivity effects
of worker cooperatives, relative to exclusive ESOPs that only incorporate ownership or
firms without any employee ownership but with some employee control, suggests that the
necessary wedding of ownership with decision-making control—the most direct,
thorough participation possible—in cooperatives is responsible for gains from workerownership.
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Additionally, the employee benefits associated with both exclusive ESOPs—
compensation—and inclusive ESOPs—compensation and job satisfaction—are equally
or more pronounced with cooperatives. Case evidence for worker cooperatives often
report higher compensation as compared with non-cooperative firms in the same industry.
Hochner et al. (1988) present a grocery cooperative in Philadelphia that “maintained
higher levels of full-time jobs at higher wages than competitors without decreasing
profits. 151 At a worker-owned grocery in the San Francisco Bay Meyer (2006) showed
that average compensation for employees was 40% greater than that of unionized grocery
workers in California. 152 A number of additional American worker cooperatives report
similar benefits; the Union Cab Cooperative in Madison, WI, Isthmus Engineering in
Madison, WI, Alvardo Street Bakery in Petaluma, CA are a few cooperatives started in
70s and 80s which have experienced marked success and boast superior member
compensation and satisfaction.
The overall performance of ESOPs relative to cooperatives does not appear to be
the source of ESOP dominance in the arena of worker ownership. Instead, the
institutionalization of ESOPs and the simultaneous exclusion of worker cooperatives
from public policy work to privilege adoption of the former over adoption of the latter.
The history of the development of ESOP legislation reveals the impetus behind their
development, the extent to which they have been employed outside their original
purposes, and the justification for making them a tax privileged entity.
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Coercive Isomorphism: Tax-favored ESOP Policy
The ESOP legislation ushered in by Senator Long provides numerous tax benefits
derived from ESOP adoption. ESOPs not only enjoy the same tax benefits available to
other qualified retirement plans—deduction of employer contributions to the plan,
exemption of trust from taxation on earning, and employee tax deferrals upon ultimate
distribution of their individual accounts—but also additional, ESOP specific tax
advantages. Because they allow employers to pay off their ESOP loans with deductible
contributions to the ESOP trust, ESOP adoption effectively provides the employer with
funds from the sale of stock to their employees “which are financed by a uniquely taxadvantaged loan in which principal as well as interest payments are tax deductible.” 153
During Senator Long’s years in office, a number of other tax incentives for ESOP
adoption were introduced. Some of these—i.e. tax credits, an estate tax deduction, and
tax exclusion on interest from ESOP loans—were later repealed, but others continue to
offer significant tax advantages; “the tax code allows employers to deduct payment of
dividends to stock held by an ESOP and promotes the use of ESOPs as an estate planning
device for retiring business owners by allowing a deferral of gain on the sale of qualified
securities to the ESOP trust.” 154 Although it is difficult to quantify precisely the
advantage ESOP adoption provides, it is evident that consideration of tax advantage is an
influential factor in ESOP adoption.
A survey of about half of all ESOPs in existence in 1985, conducted by the
General Accounting Office, is very revealing of the extent to which tax favorable policy
influenced ESOP adoption. 74 percent of surveyed ESOPs reported tax advantages as an
153
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influence in their decision to adopt the plan. 155 At the time of the survey, tax-credit
ESOPs were still available (introduced in 1974 and discontinued in 1986) and
overwhelmingly dominated the form which ESOPs took. 6,391 tax-credit ESOPs existed
in 1985, compared with a combined 692 leveraged, leverageable, and non-leveraged
ESOPs. 156 This was largely the case because tax-credit ESOPs offered “a total subsidy,
not a modest incentive such as the tax benefits for leveraged and non-leveraged
ESOPs.” 157 Tax-credit ESOPs were discontinued in 1986 because it became apparent that
they were an excessive taxpayer expenditure that, due to the way they were structured,
primarily benefited more highly paid employees. In the absence of that ESOP option, the
more modest tax benefits of remaining ESOP types continue to encourage ESOP
adoption. In the late 1980s, after the elimination of tax-credit ESOPs, leveraged ESOPs
became very popular. Between 1974 and 1986, the cumulative borrowing for leveraged
ESOPs was less than $1 billion; by the close of 1989, that number had ballooned to $30
billion.158 The history of the tax-credit ESOP and the transition to leveraged ESOPs upon
their discontinuance usefully illustrates the importance of tax favorability in informing
firm adoption of employee ownership policy.
Several authors posit the potential for cooperative formation from employeebuyouts of retiring small business owners. Despite this potential, ESOP tax advantages
related to estate planning for retiring business owners make them more attractive an
option than cooperative structuring. Specifically, “owners of a business corporation can
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receive a tax deferral on capital gains from stock sales when they sell their firm to
employees.” 159 The tax benefits from this process, known as a 1042 rollover, can more
easily be achieved through conversion to an ESOP than to a cooperative. Notably, the
advantage of conversion to an ESOP is the direct result of the fact that “conversion to a
worker cooperative must be finished in a much shorter time period than conversion to an
ESOP under cooperative incorporation statutes.” 160 Thus, while the typical 1042 rollover
ESOP is executed as a multistep transaction over five to ten years, conversion to a
cooperative must be executed as a one time, 100 percent conversion, which is rather
difficult to fund. 161 Furthermore, “commercial lenders who make loans to ESOPs are
permitted to deduct half the interest from their earning as long as the firm is at least 50%
employee owned,” thus advantaging ESOP formation over cooperatives by incentivizing
commercial lenders to grant loans for ESOPs and not for cooperatives (which lenders are
already skeptical of due to lack of familiarity and misconceptions about cooperative
viability). 162
Interestingly, although it is tax-favored in a number of ways, ESOP conversion
has been estimated to actually be more expensive that cooperative conversion.
Northcountry Cooperative Development Fund (2006) estimates that the cost to establish
an ESOP ranges from $20,000 to $35,000 on top of an annual maintenance cost between
$7,500 and $15,000—largely due to the reporting requirements of ERISA—while they
estimate establishment costs for cooperatives to be between $5,000 to $20,000 and are

159

Artz and Kim (2011) pg. 27
Ibid.
161
Ibid, citing Logue (2006)
162
Artz and Kim (2011) pg. 27, citing Martin (1994)
160

60

not subject to the same maintenance fees. 163 However, the legal codification of ESOPs
creates a level of familiarity and ease favorable to their adoption, which combined with
the time period advantages of adopting an ESOP appear to outweigh potential overall
savings.
Beatty (1994) demonstrates that ESOP adoption is not exclusively the result of tax
motivations. Indeed, she argues that ESOPs are primarily adopted for at least one of three
reasons: “as a takeover defense, as a mechanism for providing incentives to employees,
and as a vehicle for tax savings.” 164 The flexible nature of an ESOP makes it useful in
accomplishing all three of these. Interestingly, of the three reasons for adoption, two—
takeover defense and tax benefits—have very little to do with improving firm
performance or employee benefits/satisfaction and do not reflect the original intent of
ESOP legislation. It is reasonably clear that ESOPs have as substantial popularity as they
do in large part due to their institutionalization and potential tax benefits, as well as their
potential for additional firm and employee benefits.
Comparing ESOP Policy with Cooperative Policy Abroad
While in the U.S. the impact of coercive isomorphism is realized in employee
ownership in the form of ESOPs, other countries have taken public policy approaches to
enable and promote employee ownership in the form of worker cooperatives and
effectively put coercive forces of isomorphism on the side of cooperatives. Dickstein
(1986) reports that “cooperatives in Italy, France, and the kibbutzim in Israel have all
received external government or political support that has helped them become
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established.” 165 In much the same way that the U.S. privileges ESOPs, favorable
legislation in Italy, France and Spain provides cooperatives with advantages in taxation
and specialized financing, and also provides additional support for cooperative formation
and survival. There is undeniably a problem of endogeneity in identifying the exact
extent to which cooperatives are the consequence of policy or the policy the consequence
of influential cooperative systems. But, despite uncertainty about precise extent,
government support certainly contributes to making these some of the most cooperativepopulated areas in the world. Italy is home to over 7,000 worker cooperatives employing
roughly 400,000 people, while France boasts almost 2,000 cooperatives employing about
40,000 people and Spain maintains an estimated 18,000 cooperatives employing close to
300,000 people. 166 The diversity of the experience of cooperatives in the countries
suggests that While the advantages for cooperatives in Spain are quite straightforward—
they are taxed at a 10 percent rate rather than the corporate rate of 28 percent—a closer
look at the cooperative public policy in Italy and France reveals the extent to which
government support for cooperatives both enables and helps maintain cooperative
presence in an economy.
The impressive cooperative sector in Italy is assuredly the product of both
favorable government and broader environmental characteristics. Policy pertaining to
cooperative development and maintenance is of the highest order in Italy; it is enshrined
in the Constitution, indicating a noteworthy cooperative influence from the country’s
start. Corcoran and Wilson (2010) note that “Article 45 of the Constitution states that ‘the
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Republic recognises the social function of co-operation with mutual character and
without private speculation purposes. The law promotes and favors its growth with the
most appropriate means, and ensures, with appropriate controls, its character and
purposes.’” 167 The specifics of cooperative public policy today include tax breaks,
provision of regional economic development agencies, assistance in financing the
conversion of traditional firms into cooperatives, and mandated inclusion in cooperative
federations. 168 With regard to tax policy, Italian law exempts profits from taxation as
long as they are reinvested in the cooperatives. Furthermore, legislation requires that
cooperatives put at least 30 percent of annual net profit in an indivisible reserve fund for
the cooperative, which effectively helps prevent undercapitalization in the long run; over
time these indivisible reserves become quite large and are an important source of stability
for the cooperatives. 169 Importantly, the Italian government provides these tax incentives
because “co-operatives are seen as a public good that is available to future workers,” and
as a way to maintain stable sources of employment. 170
In addition to tax benefits, public policy in Italy provides for the presence of
regional economic development agencies. These agencies provide cooperatives with
assistance in “the areas of ‘research and development, education and training, workplace
safety, technology transfer, marketing and distribution, and exporting’ among others.” 171
Typically, the economic development agencies provide services difficult for small
businesses to perform in house.
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Beyond tax advantages, the Italian government assists cooperatives with
additional capitalization needs. Through the Marcora Act in 1985, the government
established a cooperative fund specifically devoted to helping fund new cooperatives.
New cooperatives may be formed in a number of ways. A number of cooperatives are
founded upon the dissolution of a traditional firm; private firms “going through
bankruptcy, moving overseas, or who [are] being sold by retiring owners" can seek
assistance from the cooperative fund to enable transition into cooperatives. 172 Even more
significantly, “since 1992, three percent of a co-op’s profits have been placed into cooperative development funds. These funds are used to help create new cooperatives,
develop existing ones, and to convert private firms into worker cooperatives.” 173 Some of
the largest cooperative federations, such as Legacoop, maintain capitalization of several
million in U.S. dollars. A final noteworthy element of Italy’s cooperative legislative
agenda is the requirement, originating in the Basevi Law of 1947, for cooperatives to join
one of three federations. This requirement creates the dual impact of increasing stability
against financial problems and organizing cooperatives into politically influential
units. 174
While generally the Italian economy is not particularly strong and has a high rate
of unemployment, the experience of the Emilia Romagna region provides support for the
argument that enabling worker cooperatives strengthens the economy. In Emilia
Romagna cooperatives boast a particularly robust presence; there are about 5,000 worker
owned cooperatives, roughly 10 percent of the workforce is employed by cooperatives,
and about 30 percent of GDP in the region is generated by worker cooperatives. The
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region has a per capita GDP 25 percent higher than the average in Italy and 36 percent
higher than the average for the European Union. In 2006, the unemployment rate was 3
percent, compared to over 8 percent for Italy generally. Furthermore, the “region has one
of the lowest rates of inequality in Europe, with a Gini coefficient of .25.” 175 And, the
region has weathered the financial crisis and economic recession remarkably well, which
some attribute to the predominance of small-businesses and cooperatives in the region. 176
Like Italy, France’s vibrant cooperatives sector is strongly supported by public
policy. Worker cooperatives in France primarily take the form of SCOPs, which
legislatively require that workers have at least 51 percent of the capital and 65 percent of
the votes in the organization. 177 While this structure differs slightly from a more
traditional worker cooperative, it maintains primary tenets of the form insofar as majority
control lies with the workers, who all maintain a stake in the company even if it is not a
100 percent stake. Importantly, this structure allows for SCOPs to obtain financing from
outside investors rather than only from employees, which is a useful source of capital.
SCOPs benefit from tax breaks through an exemption of the professional tax—about 1.5
to 2.5 percent of revenues—and an income tax exemption for income on worker
shares. 178 In order to receive these tax benefits, the cooperatives must go under “cooperative review” periodically to ensure that the organizations are operating
appropriately. 179 Additional SCOP legislation requires SCOPs to place a minimum of 15
percent of surpluses in reserves, although the actual percentage is closer to between 40

175

Ibid. pg. 6
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/3117441-unity-strength-emilia-romagna Accessed April
22, 2014
177
Corcoran and Wilson (2010)
178
Ibid.
179
Ibid.
176

65

and 45 percent on average. These SCOP “reserves are permanently owned by the cooperative, ensuring financial stability in the long run.” 180
In addition to tax planning legislation, France gives preference to cooperatives for
government contracts and provides direct assistance for the conversion of private firms
into cooperatives. France has policy to shelter markets for worker cooperatives through
public sector purchase of goods and services and gives preference to worker cooperatives
in bidding for public sector contracts when the price is equal to other bids. As discussed
earlier, conversion to an employee owned firm from a more conventional form primarily
takes the form of ESOPs in the U.S. as product of ESOP advantages and familiarity.
Dickstein (1986) notes that in “1978 France passed a new law that gave a more coherent
legal framework to cooperatives and made it much easier to convert conventional
companies to cooperatives.” 181 The institutional support for cooperatives in their
development and maintenance in France, like in Italy, is quite foundational to their
success.
Conclusion:
Worker cooperatives in the United States lack the type of government support
visible in other countries where they develop and prosper. Rather than supporting
employee ownership in the form of cooperatives, the government promotes the adoption
of ESOPs. For historical political purposes—namely the collaboration of Senator Long
and Louis Kelso—ESOPs gained legislative popularity. The ESOP friendly legislation
that has existed and developed since their introduction in 1974 has inspired widespread
adoption of such plans. Government policy acts as a mechanism of institutional
180
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isomorphism for the narrow realization of employee in ESOPs rather than cooperatives
and offers useful explanatory value about the scarcity of worker cooperatives in the U.S.
Ironically, though, the plans have most succeeded when they deviate from a pure
ESOP arrangement and more mimic cooperative organizational form. Gains from
employee ownership are more consistently realized when employee ownership resembles
the cooperatives form than when employee ownership exists in the form of an ESOP.
Many ESOPs are adopted for the purpose of accessing tax privileged capital or for
resisting hostile takeovers, not as a mechanism for increasing firm performance and
employee benefits/satisfaction; and for those ESOPs adopted with the latter goals in
mind, the ESOP structure is less apt than a cooperative model. Although employee
ownership of company shares would certainly be smaller without ESOPs, perhaps more
comprehensive employee ownership in the form of cooperatives would be more
prevalent. As the experiences in Italy and France help demonstrate, public policy focused
on cooperatives can help change the landscape of employee ownership; the incorporation
of cooperative specific legislation contributes significantly to the development and
support of cooperatives, which then allow for the realization of the benefits of
comprehensive employee ownership.
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Chapter 3:
Worker Cooperative Scarcity Part II: Mimetic and Normative Isomorphism
Although, as the previous chapter demonstrates, public policy factors are
important in explaining cooperative scarcity, so too are other environmental factors.
Lacking governmental support, cooperatives may proliferate as an organizational form
due to non-governmental support. For instance, to a great degree, the success of the
Mondragon Cooperative Corporation is attributable to the firm’s remarkable success in
building a massive support system for the development and continuation of cooperatives.
Similarly, both Italy and France boast strong cooperative federations that, as private
organizations, function to provide assistance in financing, training, development, and
management for cooperatives. While DiMaggio and Powell’s conception of coercive
factors in organizational isomorphism is quite useful in understanding the public policy
role in cooperative scarcity, their concepts of mimetic and normative factors in are useful
in interpreting non-governmental reasons for scarcity. I argue that for mimetic and
normative reasons, cooperative scarcity begets scarcity. Insofar as successful enterprises
inspire mimicry and familiarity with an organizational form yields lower informational
costs and greater access to funding the U.S. has little precedent for cooperative formation.
Nor do norms prevailing in professional education, organizational networks, early
education, and other areas of life in the U.S. cultivate propensity for cooperation.
Scarcity of the worker cooperative as an organizational form in the US economy
has important consequences for the organizational form that new entrants in the economy
take. A low density of worker cooperatives in the economy necessarily (re)produces
uncertainty about the organizational form. While successful capitalist organization spread
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awareness of the success potential of hierarchical organization, in the United States,
neither large nor numerous cooperatives exist to spread awareness of the organizational
form and combat prevailing perceptions of the organizational form as inefficient. While
one avenue for cooperative success was discussed in the previous chapter—government
promotion and support—another avenue for cooperative success and proliferation is nongovernmental support emerging out of cooperative success.
There is certainly a problem of endogeneity involved in disentangling the relative
influence of government policy from the influence of a successful non-governmental
support organizations who shelter and advocate for cooperatives. DiMaggio and Powell
readily agree that the typology they propose “is an analytic one: the types are not always
empirically distinct. For example, external actors may induce an organization to conform
to its peers by requiring it to perform a particular task and specifying the profession
responsible for its performance. Or mimetic change may reflect environmentally
constructed uncertainties.” 182 Still, in the same way that certain coercive factors are
readily identifiable in government inclusion and support for capitalist firms and
simultaneous exclusion of cooperative forms, certain mimetic and normative factors are
identifiable that help explain cooperative scarcity as the product of uncertainty and
normative exclusion often born of form scarcity. The chapter proceed in the following
manner:
Mimetic Isomorphism: The Absent Cooperative Model
As a reminder, DiMaggio and Powell explain that mimetic isomorphism results
from standard responses to uncertainty. They argue that “uncertainty…is a powerful force
that encourages imitation. When organizational technologies are poorly
182
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understood…when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic
uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations.” 183 A modeled
organization—the organization being imitated—“serves as a convenient source of
practices that the borrowing organization may use” often without any intention to do
so. 184 Thus, while the root of scarcity—governmental or non-governmental—may be
unknown or difficult to isolate, its perpetuation can be understood as a standard response
to uncertainty. Particularly in an environment in which hierarchical firm organization is
as ubiquitous as it is in the US and in which perceptions of cooperatives remain so out of
line with their empirical performance, it is easy to see how mimetic isomorphism helps to
explain cooperative scarcity.
Perotin (2006) reinforces DiMaggio and Powell’s theory of mimetic isomorphism
specifically regarding cooperatives, asserting that “legitimacy may also be conferred by
the density of existing cooperatives. The organizational ecology literature, e.g. Carroll
(1984) and Carroll and Hannan (1989), argues that as the number of organizations of a
given form grows, the form is regarded as more legitimate and this legitimacy in turn
results in more organizations of the same kind being created.” 185 Elster (1989)
corroborates Perotin’s interpretation of the impact of cooperative density on cooperative
development, articulating: “It is a truism, but an important one that workers’ preferences
are to a large extent shaped by their economic environment. Specifically, there is a
tendency to adaptive preference formation, by which the actual mode of economic
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organization comes to be perceived as superior to all others.” 186 Not only is there strong
theoretical reasoning to support the notion that, despite efficiency concerns, prevailing
organizational norms precipitate imitation even when preferable organizational forms
exist, there is also some empirical support. Countries with larger cooperative sectors—i.e.
Italy, France, and Spain—all witness greater cooperative development than the US,
despite differing levels of government support, suggesting that the cooperative density in
the economy plays some role. Furthermore, Perotin (2006), studying cooperatives in
France, demonstrates that “the density of cooperatives has he expected quadratic effect;
the size of the [worker cooperative] population acts as a legitimizing and resourcegenerating factor.” 187
The scarcity of cooperatives simultaneously leaves unchallenged the legitimacy
effect of hierarchical firm dominance in the economy, but also creates tangible costs as a
result of uncertainty. Specifically, scarcity induced uncertainty creates additional costs
for cooperatives by introducing costs associated with researching non-traditional firm
organization rather than simply mimicking prevailing organizational forms and by
making financing more difficult to procure and often more expensive when it is procured.
There are real costs associated with the need to research and study cooperative
organization in face of uncertainty due to organization scarcity. Doucouliagos (1995)
notes that organizational conformity can stem “from costs incurred in searching for
information about labor-managed firms.” 188 Cooperative scarcity produces a lack of
familiarity with the organizational model that is costly to overcome; it is simpler and less
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costly to mimic a successful hierarchically organized firm. Doucouliagos argues that this
is particularly true for entrepreneurs endeavoring to start a new business because they
already “face enough problems with setting up, meeting legal requirements, technical
specifications, marketing and distribution and quality control” much less searching “for
an alternative way of organizing the whole show” and courting additional costs. 189
However, in countries with strong cooperative sectors, the costs associated with
organizational unfamiliarity are greatly mitigated by the assistance of support
organizations.
Compounding the cost of uncertainty shouldered by the prospective cooperative
firm due to its own uncertainty are costs induced by financial organizations’ uncertainty
about cooperatives. In economies with greater cooperative density, financing institutions
are familiar with the form and have a superior understanding of the actual risk
cooperatives face, making them more willing to grant loans to such organizations as
reasonable rates. Perhaps more importantly, economies with a strong cooperative sector
are likely to maintain both governmental and non-governmental support organizations
that help lessen the costs of attaining information on cooperative organizations and
organizational form and provide assistance for establishing cooperatives. Conte (1986)
explains that the US lacks a network of supporting organizations present in some other
countries. He notes that the central roles of these organizations involve providing
informational and institutional support, assisting with the arrangement of financing—
although very rarely through subsidization—and lobbying for the “adoption of legislation
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defining cooperatives in the context of their country’s corporation laws.” 190 The practical
effect of these activities “is to decrease the uncertainty surrounding the founding and
operation of cooperative corporations.” 191
Financing worker cooperatives in the US is uniquely difficult; it is far more
difficult than financing cooperatives in countries with more hospitable public policy
and/or with a strong cooperative sector—i.e. Spain due to the Mondragon presence.
Levin (1984) explains that “one of the major difficulties faced by worker cooperatives
and worker-owned firms has been access to financial capital. Without the ability to
borrow for purposes of meeting shot-term cash flow needs or long-term expansion, these
firms have faced substantial difficulties in surviving and competing in the
marketplace.” 192 Indeed, an important result of cooperative scarcity in an economy is that
“the organizational form of [cooperatives] is relatively unknown to financiers and hence
seems to bear greater risk to financiers.” 193 Uncertainty about the cooperative form, and
the prevalence of perceptions of cooperative inefficiency in the US make lending
institutions skeptical of granting loans to cooperative organizations; when granting loans,
moreover, financiers are inclined to set the loan rate higher than they would for more
traditional capitalist firms. Without numerous or prominent cooperative organizations in
the US and a dearth of cooperative incorporation legislation, there is little to combat
uncertainty lending institutions maintain about the cooperative form.
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It is important to note that in addition to the possibility of discrimination against
cooperative firms explicitly created by uncertainty, there are other reasons cooperatives
may experience greater difficulty obtaining loans than more conventional firms. One such
reason is that “financial lenders prefer to have some measure of control over the affairs of
their borrowers, in order to assure that the borrower is following prudent practices with
regard to its financial condition.” 194 Oftentimes this concern is dealt with through the
placement of members of the financial community on the board—which is clearly out of
the question in a worker cooperative—or, in the case of small businesses, assessment of
the credit worthiness of the owner—which is very difficult considering the multiplicity of
ownership in a cooperative. 195 Additionally, cooperatives are unable to provide collateral
in the form of company stock (as it is all owned by the workers), making lending
institutions even more wary of granting a loan. Certainly, the lack of familiarity with
cooperatives compounds the negative impact of the inability of cooperatives to meet
these financier preferences; it there was less uncertainty about the cooperative form and
cooperatives success, discrimination against cooperatives by the banking industry would
pose less of a barrier to cooperative formation. And, less uncertainty ought to lead to less
mimetic isomorphism.
Normative Isomorphism: Professional Education and Networks
In addition to coercive and mimetic explanations for organizational isomorphism,
DiMaggio and Powell’s notion of normative pressures for isomorphism helps illustrate
why worker cooperatives are scarce in the US. As a reminder, they argue that isomorphic
organizational change of the normative variety “stems primarily from
194
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professionalization” which they define as “the collective struggle of members of an
occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control ‘the production
of producers’…and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational
autonomy.” 196 In particular, they outline two aspects of professionalization as important
sources of isomorphism: “one is the resting of formal education and of legitimation in a
cognitive base produced by university specialists; the second is the growth and
elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which new
models diffuse rapidly.” 197 The role of both of these is visible in the US context.
Professional economics and business education and training in the US
overwhelmingly teaches to a conventional, hierarchical firm organization. Professional
and vocational training is geared towards preparing individuals for positions within a
hierarchical organizational form—i.e. entrepreneur, manager, office assistant, etc.—
rather than towards preparing them for working in a cooperative institution. In “today’s
economics and corporate governance discourse, shareholder primacy is taken as obvious”
and investor-owned, for-profit businesses competing to maximize shareholder wealth are
almost taken for granted as preferred organizational form. A strong indication of the
primacy of capitalist organization over cooperative organization in education is the
infrequency with which cooperative forms of business structure are covered in economics
and business texts designed for educational purposes. Lynch et al. (1989) reported that
introductory economics textbooks used in the United States deemphasized

196
197

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pg. 152
Ibid.

75

cooperatives. 198 Hill (2000) revealed that “the typical textbook does not even recognize
cooperatives as a form of business organization.” 199 A survey of introductory business
texts held in the United States Library of Congress corroborated the two above
findings. 200 Interestingly, Kalmi (2007) also found evidence of a neglect of cooperatives
in economics texts, but discovered that the paucity of cooperative mention has grown
markedly since after World War II; he attributes the coincidence of decreasing attention
to cooperatives in textbooks with a “paradigm shift from institutional to neoclassical
analysis, which led to a neglect of the potential of cooperatives in addressing social
problems.” 201
The extreme dominance of investor-owned, for-profit, hierarchically structured
businesses over cooperative businesses in educational texts likely has an impact on the
perception and consideration of cooperatives as a viable business form. Parnell (1996)
posited that the exclusion of cooperatives from primary, secondary, and post-secondary
texts leaves cooperatives as a “much maligned and often neglected option.” 202 Indeed,
neglecting to teach cooperative models creates barriers for participation in cooperative
organizations. A certain set of norms are cultivated through traditional education and
training in the US, norms which align with hierarchical firm organization rather than
cooperative organization. Alternative or additional training is often necessary to cultivate
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the cooperative organizational norms crucial for cooperative success. For instance,
Dynavac, a highly successful Australian cooperative, invests at least three years of
training in democratic management in all new members because they do not generally
have appropriate training prior to joining the cooperative. 203 Normative processes of
isomorphism certainly operate through the education of business professionals to
cultivate a preference for investor-owned, hierarchically organized, more traditional firms
and a skepticism of cooperative models. And, given the prevailing organizational and
professional training norms, it is unsurprising that professional networks work to
reinforce those norms and give them greater ability to travel. DiMaggio and Powell’s
category of normative isomorphism is, in the above way, quite applicable to
understanding some of the source of cooperative scarcity in the US, but I believe that
their concept can be extended further to offer greater explanatory value.
I find it pertinent to add to this understanding of the sources of normative
isomorphism the importance of other areas of social interaction—i.e. early education,
religion, and family structure—in creating hierarchical, rather than horizontal,
democratic, norms that reinforce the normality and prevalence of traditional hierarchical
firm organization. The common culture of the workplace in the US can be understood as
“the common set of norms, values, and expectations about organizational functions and
operations that are accepted by all or most of the members of an organization.” 204 And, in
the US this common culture largely “assumes that workers compete as individuals with
other workers for wages and promotion; that the place of workers in the hierarchy of the
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firm determines their degree of relative autonomy; that the interpersonal relations among
workers are matter-of-fact relations designed to facilitate control and productivity rather
than based upon traditional social relations such as those of family or kinship; that the
main rewards for work activity are extrinsic ones such as wages, salaries, vacations,
pensions, and promotions to higher status rather than the rewards of a high degree of
control over one’s work activities and of the ability to express one’s human and creative
potential on the job.” 205 While this iteration of common culture in the workplace is not
all-pervasive in every workplace, it does reflect the ethos of most hierarchically
organized businesses and, as such, most firms in the United States. These rather
ubiquitous workplace norms certainly produce and reproduce hierarchical firm
organization, but perhaps more interestingly, they reflect norms cultivated outside of the
workplace or professional training organizations.
The contrast between the saliency of democratic ideals in the political sphere of
life relative to the personal sphere of life—the lived day-to-day experience—is quite stark
in the United States. There is a remarkable dearth of democratic decision-making
practiced in much of daily life; from a young age, individuals in the US are ensconced in
largely hierarchical institutions, such as education, religion, and family life, which
engender norms consistent with hierarchical firm organizational norms. Research
demonstrates that the schooling experience is greatly responsible for preparing
individuals for later participation in hierarchical workplaces. 206 Gamson and Levin
(1984) observe that “schools tend to be impersonal, bureaucratic, and hierarchical, like
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the typical workplace.” 207 They note the parallels between schools and workplaces,
students and workers, in the similarities between grades and grade advancement and
salaries and job advancement, expulsion for poor or disorderly school performance and
job loss for unsatisfactory job performance, a dearth of autonomy, and supervision and
evaluation by superiors who control the content of the work activity and any
rewards/sanctions. Similar to school, both family and religion tend to be organized
hierarchically rather than democratically, further reinforcing non-democratic norms.
While this type of hierarchical experience is not necessarily unique to the US, there are
few institutions of an alternative, cooperative structure to challenge their normalcy; even
if those alternative institutions are found in the business world in other countries, they
offer some greater diversity. In the US, conditioning to hierarchical structures from a
young age, unsurprisingly, makes the acceptance of such organization easier and
seemingly natural later in the workplace. And, when movements toward more
democratic—perhaps cooperative—firm organization fail to gain traction either through
professionalization and trade organizations or through cultural norms, the scarcity of
cooperatives can likely be expected to persist.
As the above explanations of firm organizational landscape allude to, there is
certain endogeneity involved in the scarcity of cooperatives; without the support of
government or the independent success of a cooperative creating a support network or
shelter organization (which is unlikely within a capitalist economy for the reasons stated
above) the landscape is rather inhospitable to cooperative success. While the last chapter
explored the governmental role—or lack thereof—in encouraging and enabling
cooperative formation, the role of non-governmental shelter organizations and networks
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are as, or perhaps more, important for the success of a cooperative sector. The
development of the Mondragon Cooperatives in Spain helps illustrate how important
non-governmental support can be. And, to a lesser degree, so does the development of
cooperatives in Italy and France.
Lessons from Mondragon, Italy, and France
The formation of structure and support organizations for cooperatives, although
necessarily emerging from the success of cooperatives in the absence of government
provision, operates to reinforce and perpetuate the success of the cooperative sector. The
history of cooperatives in Mondragon (Spain), Italy, and France all highlight the
importance of non-governmental support for the development and success of
cooperatives and cooperative systems. The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, as it
came to be called, “arose out of conditions of severe economic depression and political
repression during the Franco regime in Spain.” 208 The first cooperative was started in
1956 by “students of a young Basque priest, Father Jose Maria Arizmendi, who taught
about workplace democracy and cooperatives based on Catholic Social Doctrine as well
as on his readings about the nineteenth-century cooperative communities of Robert Owen
and the Rochdale pioneers in Britain.” 209 The success of this initial start-up prompted
growth and expansion, and, after some time, the development of new cooperatives
designed to deal with organizational and training interests (rather than production). Of
particular importance was the strategic approach pursued by Mondragon in this process.
Mondragon created a particularly united, well-integrated system by establishing
secondary cooperatives as support organizations; “as specific needs arose, key personnel
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from the cooperatives moved over to the second degree cooperatives to share their skills
with newer cooperatives.” 210 In this way, the new cooperatives had the knowledge-based
support for the cooperative form they needed to both operate as a cooperative and provide
support for present and future cooperatives. Among the support organizations are: the
League of Education and Culture, which coordinates educational centers and manpower
planning; the Caja Laboral Popular, which is a cooperative bank and cooperative
development agency; Ikerlan, which acts as a research and development institute;
Lankide Export, which is responsible for export trading; Lagun-Aro, which is essentially
and internal social security system; Ikasbide, which is a management and training center
that provides courses on cooperative, socioeconomic, and technical management
subjects; and a number of cooperative federations representing various industrial
sectors. 211
Although rather different, Italy also maintains—and has for much of its history—
a strong cooperative support system. And, while worker cooperatives are strongly
incentivized in Italy (as the previous chapter explains) there is also a very important nongovernmental support system of shelter organizations that helps explain cooperative
success in the country. Primarily responsible for acting as shelter organizations are the
three cooperative federations in Italy. These three cooperative federations represent all of
the different types of worker, consumer, and agricultural cooperatives in the country. 212
Each of the three federations—Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue,
Confederazione Cooperative Italiane, and Associazione Generale delle Cooperative
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Italiane—are backed by one or more political party in Italy. 213 In practice, the federations
are all similarly structured and “cooperate at the national level to represent the interests of
the cooperative ‘movement.’” 214 Internally, the federations each have sub-organizations
to perform specific support functions (similar to the secondary cooperatives within the
Mondragon system). For example, Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue is
constituted of a number of such sub-organizations such as a consortium to serve worker
cooperatives at the regional and national level (ANCLP) and trade organizations
representing cooperative sectors. A financial intermediary (Fincooper), an import/export
arm (Intercoop), and two insurance companies (Unipool and Unifina) grew out of
ANCLP. 215 The Lega structure is quite similar to that of the other federations. The three
shelter organizations offer important assistance in the start-up and support of
cooperatives. It is important to note that in Italy’s case, the problem of endogeneity
regarding whether cooperative success engendered government support or vice versa is
quite pronounced. There is striking “cross-sector co-operative solidarity (worker,
consumer, producer, financial)” in Italy based in a strong ethical norm of mutual aid and
dependent on the “strong system of informal networks and formal federations” found in
the country. 216 The historical popularity and mutual support of worker cooperatives in
Italy suggests that cooperative success and organizing is responsible for the extremely
favorable government policy towards cooperatives, which further reinforces the
organizational form’s strength in the country.
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France, too, must attribute some of the vibrancy of its cooperative sector to the
role of support organizations. The primary organization, the French General
Confederation of SCOPs (CG-SCOP) is composed of numerous sub-organizations
responsible for providing cooperatives with assistance in their formation and their
continued success. Among the resources provided, “CG-SCOP has a support network of
professionals in each region to help create and develop worker co-operatives, as well as
supportive financial services, industry sector federations in construction, communication
and manufacturing, and representation at the regional, national and international
levels.” 217 More specifically, this overarching support organization has a general
confederation for representation at the national level, twelve regional unions that deal
with day-to-day development of SCOPs and provide representation at the regional and
local levels, and three professional federations—sectioned into building and public
works, communication, and manufacturing, metallurgy, and technologies—to “represent
member SCOPs in dealing with authorities in their respective fields and provide
economic, technical and legal advice as well as support in the development of their
activities.” 218 While the CG-SCOP network is rather similar to the network present in
Italy and the internal system of Mondragon, France has a unique additional network; the
Association for the Promotion of Enterprise and Takeover of Enterprise (APERE)
specializes in succession planning. The organization incorporates “senior volunteer
business advisors (e.g., retired CEO’s), expert professional consultants, and national
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partners,” such as cooperative financiers and insurance companies, to provide assistance
in converting failing firms to cooperatives. 219
Conclusion
The important similarity in all the above scenarios is the development of strong
non-governmental support organizations for cooperatives. The relative importance of
governmental and non-governmental support is certainly difficult to discern, but it seems
clear that the presence of at least one is, if not necessary, rather important for the
widespread success of cooperatives. Despite a surprisingly rich history of worker
cooperatives in America, no strong support organizations have developed and maintained
a presence in the country. Curl (2009) produced an exhaustive history of cooperative
movements in the United States. He asserts that the history of cooperatives in the country
“documents how cooperatives were an integral part of numerous American communities
in many time periods” and that their role has been sorely neglected in written history. 220
Curl identifies the National Trades’ Union of the 1830s, which boasted at least eighteen
production cooperatives, as “the first impetus of worker cooperatives as a serious social
movement” in the States. 221 Throughout the ensuing years of the 1800s, the cooperative
sector grew substantially and peaked at about 300 worker cooperatives in the 1880s. At
the heart of this group of cooperatives was the Knights of Labor, who were responsible
for the organization of approximately 200 cooperatives. 222
The Knights of Labor organized with the goal “to secure to workers the full
enjoyment of the wealth they create, to harmonize the interests of labor with capital” and
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stated publicly their endeavor to “associate [their] own labors, to establish co-operative
institutions, such as will tend to supersede the wage-system, by the introduction of a cooperative industrial system.” 223 The Knights, and those worker groups they allied with, a
brief but formidable opposition to traditional firm organization in American history.
Indeed, “almost all of the Knights’ worker cooperatives were destroyed in the wake of
the ‘Great Uprising,’ 224 the monumental confrontation between labor and capital that had
been building for the entire century, and that resulted in the collapse of the Knights by the
end of the 1800s.” 225 Since that time, the absence of a strong worker cooperative support
organization has undoubtedly impacted the presence of cooperatives in the US. Although
cooperative organizations hardly disappeared altogether at the end of 1880s, the rapid and
strong expansion the Knights initiated ceased. Had the cooperative movement maintained
or even gained momentum, perhaps the type of support networks described in other
countries would have emerged in the US; perhaps the presence of a strong cooperative
network would have produced mimetic and normative isomorphism towards cooperative
organization in some sectors.

223

Ibid. pg. 87, citing Powderly (1889), Thirty Years of Labor
See Chapter 5 of Curl for greater detail on the Great Uprising
225
Ibid. pg. 5
224

85

Conclusion
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and struck the
match that truly ignited the recession beginning in December of 2007 into the worst
economic recession in 80 years. The unemployment rate before the Great Recession, as it
has come to be known, was 4.4 percent; it peaked at over 10 percent in October of
2009. 226 Interestingly, in the latter half of 2009, while overall economic activity, as
measured by GDP, rebounded, unemployment continued to rise. 227 And, while
unemployment continued to slump and the economy suffer, Wall Street posted its best
performance since taxpayers bailed out the too big to fail banking industry. These events,
in large part, kick-started the Occupy Wall Street movement. Emerging from the
movement, demands for greater responsibility and democratic organization in the
economy revealed a discontentment with what businesses had been doing in the
economy. Occupy members, and others, expressed their sentiment that the role of
business in society has to do with more than just producing a high GDP and jobs in
flourishing economic times; they have an obligation to treat employees as more than
fungible inputs and to work to serve the entire economy, not just the 1%. And, the crisis
has not only inspired the everyday worker, but also economists to “question the orthodox
approach to production and capital/labor relation over the last two to three decades.” 228
The time may be ripe for change. Cooperative organizations offer an alternative to both
the commercial banking organizations responsible for the crisis and to the hierarchical,
profit-driven firm organization Occupy Wall Street railed against.
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Despite conventional wisdom, cooperative scarcity is not exclusively, or perhaps
even primarily, the consequence of economic inefficiency. Institutional forces—coercive,
mimetic, normative, or some combination of the three—function to influence firm
structure. Certainly, cooperative enterprises are relatively more or less appropriate
business models depending on sector and a number of other factors. But—the
pronounced scarcity of cooperatives (particularly worker cooperatives) in the United
States cannot simply be explained in terms of economic efficiency. While the current
cooperative landscape is not thriving, the scarcity of cooperatives need not be endlessly
perpetuated by the cyclically reproduced preferences for hierarchical firms evidenced in
the body of this work. Indeed, perhaps the current moment offers a unique opportunity
for cooperatives to gain institutional support—both governmental and nongovernmental—and proliferate.
Despite the—admittedly—formidable barriers to cooperative enterprises explored
throughout the preceding pages, I would like to devote the closing pages of this work to
discussing the potential for cooperatives to grow in both size and scale in the United
States. For, while the barriers are formidable, they are not indestructible. Both
governmental and non-governmental measures can be, and in some ways already are
being, pursued to create a more hospitable environment for cooperative formation and
success. As discussed in the introduction, cooperatives take a number of forms, but here I
will continue to focus narrowly on credit unions and worker cooperatives.
Credit Unions
As the first chapter argues, the Common Bond, lending, and financial
services requirements for credit unions hinder the organizations’ growth and ability to
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provide as accessible and convenient services as their commercial bank competitors.
Because the largest cause of scarcity is situated in the policies that dictate their allowable
behaviors—that is, coercive, governmental force—it is reasonable to expect that changes
in policy would be instrumental to credit union expansion. While the American Bankers
Association is, as discussed, a powerful source of opposition to easing restrictions on
credit union, the gradual softening of the Common Bond and financial services
restrictions upon credit unions gives reason for optimism about further relaxation of such
restrictions. In particular, the multi-bond Common Bond interpretation and residential
understandings of the Common Bond could potentially be combined to expand the
potential market for credit unions and allow them to take greater advantage of economies
of scale.
In 2013, bipartisan legislation was introduced in the House and the Senate that
proposed to increase the member business lending cap from 12.25 percent to 27.5
percent. In March 2014, another piece of bipartisan legislation was introduced in the
House to exempt certain residential loans from credit unions’ statutory cap on member
business loaning, which would make it possible for credit unions to lend more to small
business without running up against the current cap. 229 Although neither proposal has at
this date been passed, the presence of such legislation is promising for the future of credit
union growth. Surely, the ABA will continue to staunchly oppose the expansion of credit
union market and/or lending abilities, but the presence of such movement is encouraging.
And, in the wake of the financial crisis when sentiments about commercial banking are
rather negative, perhaps support for alternatives will be substantial. I focus here on
potential sources of change originating in public policy because credit union scarcity is
229
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overwhelmingly the consequence of public policy. Mimetic and normative pressures do
not appear to impact credit union share in the market as they do worker cooperatives,
perhaps because a somewhat substantial—at least visible—credit union sector exists in
the US that acts as model and maintains professional networks that offer support, while
worker cooperatives are all but invisible in the economy.
Worker Cooperatives
As the second chapter argues, there are substantial coercive forces at play in the
form that employee ownership takes in the United States. Specifically, the federal
endorsement and preferential treatment of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
operates to privilege ESOPs over worker cooperatives as a means for employee
ownership. Unfortunately, ESOPs less reliably capture the worker and firm benefits
offered by worker cooperative and are, by and large, a messy tool for comprehensive
worker ownership that involves substantial ownership and worker participation. Because
most states do not maintain worker cooperative specific statutes, worker cooperatives are
often complicated to organize and must be organized along formally incorporated
business guidelines—i.e. an LLC, C-Corp, or S-Corp. In 1982, Massachusetts passed the
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 157a, a statute specifically for Employee
Cooperative Corporations. The state’s law has recently served as a guide for the
development of worker cooperative corporation statutes in several other states. 230 Beyond
creating a ready-made legal structure for establishing a worker cooperative, such statutes
ensure that worker cooperatives organize around fundamental cooperative principles,
such as one worker, one vote. The introduction of a federal law modeled after the popular
230
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Massachusetts model could provide important legal endorsement and guidance for the
structuring and establishment of worker cooperatives. Although the Massachusetts model
offers a guide for government incorporation of worker cooperatives, it does not tackle the
privileges ESOPs enjoy in the form of tax incentives. Perhaps similar advantages could
be extended to worker cooperatives.
As the third chapter demonstrates, mimetic and normative forces also contribute
to the scarcity of worker cooperatives in America. Historically no non-governmental
support system or shelter organization for worker cooperatives has emerged and
maintained a strong presence in the United States to act as a model and mentor to
emerging cooperatives. However, there is interesting progress on that front taking place
in the United States. In 2009, Mondragon’s global expansion reached America. In
Cleveland, Evergreen Cooperative Laundry (ECL) began operations “with some guidance
from Mondragon and using its model.” 231 Since 2009, ECL has successfully expanded to
become a three-part network under the name Evergreen Cooperatives. Following the
example set by Mondragon, and implementing best practices have helped the cooperative
grow and will likely enable Evergreen Cooperatives to support further cooperative
development.
Even more noteworthy, Mondragon, also in 2009, and the United Steelworkers
union established a working relationship “whose goal is to move in the direction of
building manufacturing co-ops in the United States and Canada.” 232 The working
relationship soon produced promising results, and in March of 2012, the United
Steelworkers and Mondragon, in collaboration with the Ohio Employee Ownership
231
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Center, engaged in an endeavor “to spread the word about worker owned co-ops and how
to build them” in a publication entitled “Sustainable Jobs, Sustainable Communities: The
Union Co-op Model.” 233 Leo Gerard, the President of the Steelworkers, explains that
“this new public domain template…offers a road-map primer for competitive and
equitable employment creation based on fifty-five years of Mondragon principles put into
marketplace practice.” 234
The union co-op model outlined by this collaboration strives to provide guidance
“to create social and economic justice and worker dignity through the creation of good,
sustainable jobs in viable, sustainable businesses that are accountable to both its workers
and the communities in which they operate.” 235 The model promotes the ten core
Mondragon values—open admission, democratic organization, sovereignty of labor,
instrumental and subordinate nature of capital, participation in management, wage
solidarity, inter-cooperation, social transformation, universality, and education—as a
natural corollary to union goals. The collaboration seeks to reinvigorate the spirit of labor
union principles in America through a cooperative business model that has demonstrated
itself to be remarkably successful and has already been successfully adapted to use within
the US. Following this model, independent cooperatives may be able to successfully scale
up and, in turn, support the formation of other cooperatives.
I stressed throughout the second and third chapter the interrelatedness of policy
with norms and mimicry. Ultimately, the policy changes I just discussed will likely
emerge only if norms change and imitation of cooperative models is contingent upon the
233
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presence of strong model institutions. These changes are more likely to occur if the
institutional mechanisms that have prevented them in the past are shaken. I highlighted
the impact of the Great Recession at the opening of this conclusion because, although far
from certain, it just may have shaken the system enough to open it up to the start of some
change.
In an interview in 1995, Jaroslav Vanek, one of the foremost economic scholars
of worker self-management and ownership, was asked why cooperatives do not work in
America to which he responded: “If you go to a bank and ask for a loan to start a co-op,
they will throw you out. Co-ops in the West are a bit like sea water fish in a freshwater
pond. The capitalist world in the last 200 years has evolved its own institutions,
instruments, political frameworks etc. There is no guarantee that another species could
function if it had to depend on the same institutions.” To a large degree this rings true.
Applying DiMaggio and Powell’s formulation of sources of institutional organizational
isomorphism provide an analytical lens for teasing out the types of institutions Vanek is
referring. Cooperative scarcity in the United States has traditionally been,
unsatisfactorily, explained by economic inefficiency arguments. And, while it is
important to keep in mind the importance of sectoral and competitive differences that
advantage one organizational model over another, an institutional approach supplements
this understanding quite well, particularly when the empirical evidence on cooperatives
comes into direct conflict with broadly applied inefficiency arguments. My hope is that
this project has succeeded in providing that supplement.
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